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Condominium Litigation
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A.

MANDELKORN* AND MICHAEL
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The authors examine the growth and development of condominium law through an analysisof recent decisions and legislation. Several aspects of substantive law which are unique to the
area of condominium law are identified.
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INTRODUCTION

The dominant role played by the condominium in Florida housing can be measured by the growth and development of condominium litigation as a separate area of substantive law. While the laws
that bear on other real property and commercial transactions contribute to the resolution of condominium disputes, the legal relationships that are unique to the condominium merit separate consideration. The conflicts among unit owners, associations and developers embrace a myriad of issues and disputes and have demanded
much effort and attention from the judicial, legislative and executive branches of state and federal government.
The purpose of this article is to examine the recent judicial and
legislative developments that have contributed significantly to the
body of Florida condominium law. Since this is the first survey
article on condominium litigation, decisions prior to the survey period will occasionally be discussed. Where appropriate, a general
discussion of an area, in addition to the case survey, will be provided
to offer a more complete understanding than that which would be
supplied by a recent case survey alone.
II.

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION STANDING AND CLASS ACTIONS

A. Introduction
The condominium form of ownership is a system of property
ownership through which all unit owners receive fee simple title to
their unit and an undivided interest in the common areas of the
building and grounds.' Unit owners assume common obligations'
and respond collectively to the needs of the condominium and its
owners.' The condominium association is the entity through which
this community of interest is expressed and protected. The condominium association is responsible for the administration and operation of the condominium property4 and the maintenance, repair and
1. FLA. STAT. § 718.106 (1977) provides for the passage of an undivided share in the
common elements with each unit.
2. The responsibility for expenses and assessments properly incurred by a residential
condominium association is shared by unit owners in the same proportion or percentage as
their ownership of common elements. Id. § 718.115(2).
3. The administration of the condominium is the responsibility of the association, of
which each unit owner is a shareholder or member. Id. § 718.111(1). The form of administration of the association is set forth in the bylaws which are supplemented by the provisions of
§ 718.112. The provisions of §§ 718.112(2)(a)-(g) are mandatory while those of §§
718.112(3)(a)-(d) are optional. These sections provide, in part, for unit owner voting, open
board of directors meetings, notice of meetings and budget adoption procedures.
4. Id. § 718.111(2).
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replacement of the common elements.' Essentially, the association
provides a system of self-government in which the rights of individual owners are preserved through a form of participatory democracy.
The nature of the ownership form and the role assumed by the
condominium association logically demand that the association be
permitted to sue and to defend in a representative capacity, on the
common claims and obligations of its unit owner members.
Only recently, however, has the extent of an association's ability to maintain litigation in a representative capacity been legislatively and judicially defined so as to permit an association controlled by unit owners to institute, to maintain or to settle actions
with regard to matters of common interest. The legislative development of the association's capacity first utilized existing class action
principles and later included the concept of a representative form
of action. Subsequently, the legislative concepts were sanctioned
and adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida.
B.

Legislative Authority

By amending the Condominium Act' in 1974, the legislature
sanctioned an association's right to maintain, on behalf of its unitowner members, a class action with regard to matters of common
interest. The legislative grant of authority or standing was incorporated within section 711.12(2) of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974),
in the following form:
When the board of administration is not controlled by the developer, the association shall have authority and the power to maintain a class action and to settle a cause of action on behalf of unit
owners of a condominium with reference to matters of common
interest, including, but not'limited to, the common elements, the
roof and structural components of a building or other improvement, and mechanical, electrical, and plumbing elements serving
an improvement or a building, as distinguished from mechanical
elements serving only a unit. In any case in which the association
has the authority and the power to maintain a class action, the
association may be joined in an action as representatives of that
same class with reference to litigation and disputes involving the
matters for which the association could bring a class action.
The legislature apparently concluded that the condominium
association, as the entity responsible for the administration and
5. Id. § 718.113(1).
6. Condominium Act, 1963 Fla. Laws, ch. 63-35, §§ 1-25 (current version at FLA. STAT.

§§ 718.101-.508 (1977)).
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maintenance of the condominium property, was the logical entity
through which common claims and rights could be represented and
resolved. The procedural vehicle chosen by the legislature as the
means of fulfilling this purpose was the class action. Although the
scope of the association's right to maintain a class action on behalf
of its members was limited to matters of common interest, the legislature did not define common interest beyond using the common
elements and common mechanical examples. It is arguable that the
legislature's common interest standard is consistent with existing
standards of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 and that the
statute's impact is directed to the capacity of the condominium
association to maintain the claim. The underlying common interest
test basic to class action maintenance may in fact have been preserved in the context of an association's representative capacity.
Section 711.12(2) first received judicial consideration in
Wittington Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Braemar Corp.8 The
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, cited the statute in support of its conclusion that the association was capable of stating a
cause of action in its individual capacity with regard to claims of
breach of contract and negligent construction. 9 The validity or effect
of the statute was not the central issue on appeal;" ° therefore, the
Wittington Condominium decision did not provide a particularly
significant analysis of section 711.12(2). Nevertheless, the Fourth
District commented that section 711.12(2) had, in all likelihood,
removed an association's prior disabilities to proceed as a class representative."
This statutory grant of class action authority was fully examined in Imperial Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Brown.' 2 Confronted
directly with the issue of the effect of section 711.12(2), the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that section 711.12(2) established a class action as a matter of law with regard to an association's right to represent unit owners on matters relating to the common elements."3 After a preliminary hearing on the propriety of the
7. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220 provides: "When the question is one of common or general
interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole."
8. 313 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).

9. Id. at 468.
10. The issue on appeal to the Fourth District was the propriety of the trial court's final
judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant developers. The trial court was found to
have erroneously determined that the pleadings failed to demonstrate the capacity or standing of the association. Id.

11. Id. at 469 (Downey, J., concurring).
12. 338 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
13. Id. at 1084-85.
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class action, the trial court had determined that the association
could not represent its unit-owner members with regard to claims
sounding in breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, declaratory judgment and equitable relief from unconscionable documents.'4 The trial court found that the purported class of unit owners was comprised of members occupying diverse positions with regard to the claims against the developer-lessor. 5
In reviewing the trial court's orders, the Fourth District gave
complete deference to the legislative grant of authority. It concluded
that the class action condoned by the legislature would not only be
consistent with the form of action permitted under Rule 1.220, but
also that it existed as a matter of law, independent of the class
action permitted under Rule 1.220.1 In allowing the association to
maintain the action on behalf of all present owners, the Fourth
District recognized that differences among the rights of individual
owners may require subclasses for the purpose of determining damages.' 7 Yet, it did not permit variances among unit-owner positions
to defeat the association's right to proceed on behalf of the whole,
-where the claims were limited to common elements and other common claims.
The association was thereby permitted to maintain, individually, and on behalf of its unit-owner members, claims for damages
with regard to the construction of the common elements and equitable claims for relief from both a recreation lease and a pledge agreement to which essentially all unit owners were bound. With the
enactment of section 711.12(2), it appeared that a condominium
association would be able to raise matters of common interest to
unit owners without regard to whether the association could raise
the claim in its individual capacity.
Section 711.12(2) was subsequently repealed and replaced by
section 718.111(2) of the Florida Statutes.' 8 The statute's import is
Id. at 1082.
Id. at 1083 n.4.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
18. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(2) (Supp. 1976)(amending FLA. STAT. § 711.12(2) (1975))(current version at FLA. STAT. § 718.111(2) (1977)). Section 718.111(2) provides, in pertinent part:
14.
15.
16.
17.

After control of the association is obtained by unit owners other than the developer, the association may institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or hearings

in its name on behalf of all unit owners concerning matters of common interest,
including, but not limited to, the common elements; the roof and structural
components of a building or other improvements; mechanical, electrical, and
plumbing elements serving an improvement or a building; representations of the
developer pertaining to any existing or proposed commonly used facilities; and
protesting ad valorem taxes on commonly used facilities. If the association has

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:875

similarly directed to the association's standing or capacity to maintain claims with regard to matters of common interest. Noticeably,
the legislature shifted the consideration from the association's right
to maintain a class action to the association's standing or capacity
as a representative of its unit-owner members.
C.

Judicial Adoption of an Association's Ability to Maintain
Litigation in a Representative Capacity

Until recently, the issue of whether the legislature had impermissibly interfered with the Supreme Court of Florida's rule-making
authority, under the Florida Constitution of 1968,11 had never been
addressed, although the constitutional argument was raised by the
appellees in Imperial Towers. 0 The issue, however, was squarely
confronted in Avila South Condominium Association v. Kappa
Corp.,2 1 in which the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a trial court
determination that sections 711.12(2) and 718.111(2) of the Florida
Statutes represented an impermissible incursion by the legislature
into the supreme court's authority to adopt rules of practice and
procedure.22 The supreme court preserved its rule-making power by
holding the two statutory schemes unconstitutional. The court,
however, recognized the need for defining the association's right to
represent its members on common claims and took the occasion to
exercise its rule-making authority by amending Rule 1.220 to incorporate the legislative concept as an addition to the existing class
action rule. 3 This addition to the class action rule establishes the
the authority to maintain a class action, the association may be joined in an
action as representative of that class with reference to litigation and disputes
involving the matters for which the association could bring a class action.
19. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). The 1968 constitution restricts the power to adopt rules
for the "practice and procedure in all courts" to the Supreme Court of Florida.
20. Brief for Appellees at 42.
21. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
22. Id. at 607-08.
23. Id. at 608. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b) provides as follows:
(b) Condominium Associations. After control of a condominium association is obtained by unit owners other than the developer, the association may
institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf of
all unit owners concerning matters of common interest, including, but not limited
to, the common elements; the roof and structural components of a building or
other improvements; mechanical, electrical, and plumbing elements serving an
improvement or a building; representations of the developer pertaining to any
existing or proposed commonly used facilities; and protesting ad valorem taxes
on commonly used facilities. If the association has the authority to maintain a
class action under this section, the association may be joined in an action as
representative of that class with reference to litigation and disputes involving the
matters for which the association could bring a class action under this section.
Nothing herein limits any statutory or common law right of any individual unit
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right of a condominium association to maintain a cause of action as
a representative plaintiff on behalf of its unit-owner members with
regard to matters of common interest. 4
It now appears that an association may utilize either the common law class action device or the representative form of action
adopted by the supreme court as Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.220(b). Despite the procedural vehicle utilized, the scope of an
association's right to proceed on behalf of its unit-owner members
is restricted to "matters of common interest," the complete definition of which still remains a subject of judicial resolution. Recent
decisions have provided some examples.
In Avila, the supreme court included the right to maintain a
cause of action sounding in self-dealing and unconscionability
within the scope of the association's capacity to represent its members. The Fourth District, in Imperial Towers, approved the association's standing with regard to claims of breach of contract, breach
of implied warranty, declaratory judgment and unconscionability.
The supreme court, however, determined in Avila that an association's capacity to maintain representative suits does not extend to
claims based upon fraud or the homestead exemption. Representative claims sounding in fraud or requiring inquiry into each owner's
owner or class of unit owners to bring any action which may otherwise be available.
24. Subsequent to its decision in Avila, the supreme court reaffirmed its amendment to
Rule 1.220. The Florida Bar, through its Civil Procedure Rules Committee, had petitioned
for leave to intervene on rehearing for the purpose of participating in the adoption of any
amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The supreme court denied the petition
for leave to intervene but entertained the application as an original petition to modify Rule
1.220(b). In re Rule 1.220(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 353 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1977)(per
curiam).
The Civil Procedure Rules Committee of the Florida Bar recommended that Rule
1.220(b) was unnecessary in view of the repeal, in 1976, of § 711.12(2) and the enactment of
§ 718.111(2). The committee also argued that the court's decision in Avila was an intrusion
into the realm of the legislature, since "capacity" to sue is a substantive right which is the
prerogative of the legislature, and § 718.111(2) merely created that capacity for condominium
associations. Brief for Petitioner at 35.
The contrary position was assumed by the Consumer Protection Law Committee of the
Florida Bar in a supplemental brief to the supreme court. While the Civil Procedure Rules
Committee argued for retention of a single class action rule, the Consumer Protection Law
Committee supported a separate class action rule directed to condominium litigation. The
Consumer Protection Law Committee reasoned that the existing class action rule might
minimize the effectiveness of an association's capacity by applying standards or principles
that developed from factual circumstances dissimilar to the relationships unique to the condominium form of ownership. Brief for Petitioner at 6.
The supreme court denied the petition of the Civil Procedure Rules Committee and
concluded that the peculiar features of the condominium form of ownership require a separate
rule with regard to class action standing. The court held that, as to matters of common
interest, a condominium association may represent the class composed of its members, and
that nonconsenting unit owners may opt out of such class actions.
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homestead status were found to be inherently diverse and, therefore,
incapable of being raised by an association. 5 Additionally, standing
to maintain an action to quiet title in the unit owners has consistently been restricted to unit owners."
D.

The Association as a Class Defendant

The principles which support the association's right to maintain a cause of action bear significantly upon the ability of the
association to be a defendant class representative in litigation
brought against the association and its members. In ParadiseShores
Apartments, Inc. v. Practical Maintenance Co.,1 7 the plaintiff, a

management company, sued the association, as a representative of
a .class consisting of the unit owners, for damages arising out of the
association's alleged breach of contract and interference with a contractual relationship, and for equitable relief. The association had
executed a management agreement with the plaintiff at a time when
the association was under the control of the developer and prior to
the creation of the condominium." After control was turned over to
the non-developer unit owners, the association terminated the contract upon a vote of seventy-five percent of its members. Unit-owner
payments under the agreement ceased.29
Upon review of the trial court's denial of a challenge to maintenance of the suit as a class action, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, determined that the record supported the maintenance of the defendant class action on the breach of contract
count." The case, however, was remanded to the trial court for a
25. 347 So. 2d at 608-09. In refusing to permit the maintenance of a class action with
regard to claims sounding in fraud and deceit, the supreme court followed the rule established
by the district courts of appeal. See Breslerman v. Dorten, Inc., 320 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1975); Rosenwasser v. Frager, 307 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); Hendler v. Rogers House
Condominium, Inc., 234 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). But see Davidson v. Lely Estates,
Inc., 330 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976)(subdivision lot owners and a community association
were permitted to maintain a class action to impose a constructive trust, the basis for which
was grounded in fraud and misrepresentation).
26. Royal Bahamian Ass'n v. Morgan, 338 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); Reibel v.
Rolling Green Condominium A, Inc., 311 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); Commodore Plaza
at Century 21 Condominium Ass'n v. Saul J. Morgan Enterprises, Inc., 301 So. 2d 783 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1974); Hendler v. Rogers House Condominium, Inc., 234 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970).
27. 344 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
28. The declaration of condominium specifically referred to the agreement and further
provided that each unit owner, his heirs, successors and assigns were to be bound by the
agreement. Accordingly, the agreement was in force at a time prior to the creation of the
condominium and at a time when the developer was in control of the association. Id. at 302.
29. Id. at 300.
30. Id. at 303.
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determination of whether the class could be defined with some degree of certainty; whether the named representatives were adequate
representatives of the class; and whether a sufficient community of
interest existed." The Second District's concern was for those who
did not vote in favor of breaking the management agreement and
for those whose rights and obligations, with regard to the agreement,
might differ from those which were alleged. The Second District
adhered to the common law procedural requirement that the trial
court make a determination early in the proceedings as to the propriety of the suit proceeding as a class action. 32 Despite the remand
for further trial court inquiry, it appears that the identity between
the association and its members may serve as a basis from which
the association could be held accountable as a defendant class representative.3

E. Conclusion
During the survey period, the right and ability of a condominium association to represent its unit-owner members in the resolution of common problems appears to have been firmly established.
Control over the extent of this representative capacity has been
assumed by the supreme court. Further litigation will clarify the
scope of the association's capacity by defining those matters which
fall within the term "common interest."
III.

LEASE LITIGATION

In 1965, the Condominium Act was amended to permit a condominium association to enter into a lease of recreation and other
facilities. 3 The recreation or long-term lease typically involves the
rental of improved real property to the condominium association,
which becomes obligated for the rental payments. The lease obligation, by one of a variety of methods, is passed through the association to each unit owner in the condominium. This obligation becomes legally binding on all owners at the time of their unit purchase.
31. Id. at 303-04.
32. Id. (citing Costin v. Hargraves, 283 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973) and Federated
Dep't Stores v. Pasco, 275 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973)).
33. This identity was sufficient to undermine a cause of action for tortious interference
with a contractual relationship. Having determined that the unit owner participation in the
decision to break the contract was inseparable from the association's action, the Second
District held that third party interference did not exist in support of the claim. 344 So. 2d at
301.
34. FLA. STAT. § 711.121 (1965)(current version at FLA. STAT. § 718.114 (1977)).
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The lease obligation is usually assumed by the association at a
time prior to the developer's conveyance of title to any of the units
and when the association is under the developer's control. In most
cases, the lease is a net-net lease whereby the lessee is responsible
not only for the rental amount, but also for the expenses of maintenance, taxes, insurance and all other charges and obligations with
regard to the property. Escalation clauses may operate to increase
the rent at regular intervals in accordance with a formula based
upon recognized commodity or consumer price indices.
Of all the disputes between condominium owners and developers, the controversy over recreation or long-term leases has been
the most vociferous. Highly organized and publicized opposition to
such leases has prompted substantial legislative, judicial and executive efforts toward regulation or invalidation of these leases.
A.

Statutory Regulation of Agreements Entered into by the
Association
1.

ESCALATION CLAUSES

Escalation clauses in recreational facilities leases or condominium management contracts which are tied to commodity or consumer price indices were declared void on public policy grounds in
section 711.231 of the Florida Statutes." The legislative prohibition
extended to both the inclusion and the enforcement of escalation
clauses, and prompted a judicial determination of whether this
amendment to the Condominium Act could be retroactively applied
to leases and management contracts in existence prior to June 4,
1975, the effective date of the statute.
In Fleeman v. Case,3" the Supreme Court of Florida held that
35. Id. § 711.231 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 718.302(3) & .401(8) (1977)). Section
711.231 provided as follows:
It is declared that the public policy of this state prohibits the inclusion or enforcement of escalation clauses in leases [for recreational facilities or other commonly
used facilities serving condominiums] or management contracts for condominiums, and such clauses are hereby declared void for public policy. For the purposes of this section, an escalation clause is any clause in a condominium lease
or management contract which provides that the rental under the lease or fee
under the contract shall increase at the same percentage rate as any nationally
recognized and conveniently available commodity or consumer price index.
In 1976, the Condominium Act was split into two chapters, one dealing with condominiums and the other with cooperative apartments. The sections were renumbered, resulting
in management and recreational contracts being separated. Thus, § 711.231 became §§
718.302(3) and 718.401(8). Since most of the subsequent case law discussed involves interpretations of the 1975 statute, the old numbering system will be retained in the text.
36. 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976). Three separate appeals were consolidated for argument
before and disposition by the Supreme Court of Florida. Fleeman v. Case, Plaza Del Prado
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section 711.231 could not be applied retroactively to prohibit the
inclusion or enforcement of escalation clauses in leases and contracts executed prior to the effective date of the statute. In reaching
this decision, the court limited its preliminary inquiry to whether
the statute exhibited an express and unequivocal legislative intent
that its provisions be applied to leases and management contracts
predating its effective date. The court found no such intention. 7
The supreme court could have limited its decision to a determination that the statute did not permit an interpretation that the
legislature intended retroactive application. Instead, it proceeded to
resolve the constitutional issue upon which the appeal was predicated. The court concluded that even if an intention to have the
statute apply retroactively could be found, such an application
would impair the obligation of contract and would thereby be prohibited by article I, section 10 of both the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of Florida.38
While eliminating the use of section 711.231 as a basis for attacking escalation clauses in leases and management contracts entered into prior to its effective date, the supreme court cautioned
that it was not precluding the viability of other theories upon which
challenges to leases could be brought." Furthermore, the court did
not decide whether the prospective application of section 711.231
would be constitutionally permissible, since that issue was not
raised on appeal. 0
There has been one instance in which the escalation prohibition
was applied to a lease predating its enactment. In Kaufman v.
Shere,4' the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed a trial
court determination that the Declaration of Condominium, the
lease contract, had expressly provided for the adoption of future
legislative enactments. 2 The determination was based upon an in-,
terpretation of the following provision:
Except where variances permitted by law appear in this Declaration or in the. annexed By-Laws or in the annexed Chapter of
FIFTH MOORINGS CONDOMINIUM, INC., or in lawful
amendments thereto, the provisions of the Condominium Act as
Condominium Ass'n v. Del Prado Corp. and Department of Business Regulation v. Johnson
were all appealed directly to the supreme court, because in each instance the trial court had
passed on the statute's constitutionality.
37. Id. at 817.
38. Id. at 818.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 817 n.4.
41. 347 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
42. Id. at 628.
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presently existing or as it may be amended from time to time
including the definitions therein contained are adopted and included herein by express reference.' 3
The court found section 711.231 to be incorporated within the lease
so as to prohibit the enforcement of the escalation clause after the
effective date of the statute."
The prospective validity of section 711.231 was first tested in
Schlytter v. Baker, 5 where it withstood a challenge brought under
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
In Schlytter, plaintiffs, investors in Florida real estate, brought an
action for declaratory judgment claiming that the prohibition
against inclusion or enforcement of escalation clauses was invalid
when measured against the contract and property rights guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment. While recognizing that such rights
are subject to the state's police power to adopt reasonable restrictions to safeguard the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens, plaintiffs contended that the restriction against the inclusion
or enforcement of escalation clauses was so unreasonable and irrational that it conflicted with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Plaintiffs further contended that by singling out escalation clauses in recreation leases and management contracts, the
legislature denied them equal protection under the law.
The substance of plaintiffs' due process argument was that the
legislative purpose of curbing inflation"6 was not served by the statute since the escalation clause was not, in and of itself, inflationary.'" Rather, it was a reflection of the inflationary trend in the
economy. Furthermore, the effect of the statute was to penalize
those benefiting from long term leases and management contracts.
Since the value of an owner's condominium unit could be expected
to keep pace with inflation, their investment would remain static.
The trial court found plaintiffs' contentions to be without
merit, thereby preserving the state's right to impose economic regulations so long as such regulations do not conflict with specific fed43. Id.

44. Id. Relying solely upon an interpreted express intention to incorporate all amendments to the Condominium Act, the Third District did not appear to consider the lease as
an independent instrument embodying a contractual undertaking separate and distinct from

the declaration. Furthermore, in determining the developer's intention, the court apparently
failed to take into consideration the entire declaration and how the sum of its provisions

affected the interpretation of this isolated provision. The court, however, did appear to
consider the vested rights that were created by the declaration and the lease and whether
such rights had any bearing on a reasonable interpretation of the provision.
45. No. 76-40 (N.D. Fla., Aug. 11, 1977).

46. See 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-61.
47. Schlytter v. Baker, No. 76-40, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Fla., Aug. 11, 1977).
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eral laws. 8 The court afforded wide latitude to the state legislature
in determining the method and the manner by which business practices within the state are controlled. Since a major part of the equal
protection argument was based upon similar contentions, the court
deferred once again to the legislature's objectives and determined
with equal facility that the classification could not be considered
wholly arbitrary. 9
2.

FAIR AND REASONABLE TERMS

During the course of amending the Condominium Act in 1975,
the legislature enacted section 711.66(5)(e) of the Florida Statutes
(1975), 5° which provided in pertinent part: "Any grant or reservation
made by a declaration or cooperative document, lease or other document, and any contract made by an association prior to assumption
of control of the association by unit owners other than the developer
shall be fair and reasonable." The "fair and reasonable" standard
was enacted in an apparent effort to apply a standard, however
undefined, to those acts of a condominium association which served
to bind the association and its members at a time when control of
the association is vested with the developer.
Consistent with its reasoning in Fleeman, the Supreme Court
of Florida in Avila South Condominium Association v. Kappa
Corp.5 could not find a legislative intent to have the statute apply
retroactively. Since the statute did not expressly or impliedly command retroactive application, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court dismissal of the count of the complaint seeking to hold a preexisting recreational lease to the "fair and reasonable" standard of
section 711.66(5)(e). The court made certain, however, that its
ruling did not preclude plaintiffs from amending their claim on
remand to assert a claim of unconscionability.5 3
During the pendency of Avila, the identical issue was presented
to the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Point East One
Condominium Corp. v. Point East Developers." Upon its issuance,
the supreme court's Avila decision controlled the disposition of this
question. Accordingly, the Third District affirmed the trial court's
48. Id.
49. Id. at 6.
50. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-224, § 11 (current version with some modifications at FLA.
STAT. § 718.302 (1977)).
51. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
52. Id. at 605.
53. Id.
54. 348 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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dismissal of the cause of action that asserted the "fair and reasonable" standard." It is interesting to note that the Third District, in
much the same manner as did the supreme court in Avila, expressed
concern that its decision not be construed as precluding plaintiffs
from amending their complaint to state a cause of action of unconscionability, independent of the "fair and reasonable" standard of
section 711.66(5)(e). 6
B. Antitrust Implications of the Recreation Lease
1.

FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

a.

Introduction

The theory that recreation leases run afoul of antitrust laws
prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade has been broadly embraced. During his campaign swing through South Florida in the
summer of 1975, President Carter promised that, if elected, his
administration would "vigorously enforce the federal antitrust laws
against illegal recreation leases." 7 At the same time, Florida's congressional representatives urged the Federal Trade Commission to
exercise its authority to enforce federal antitrust laws"8 by attacking
recreation leases. As well, Florida legislators, under pressure from
well-organized condominium unit-owner groups, urged the Attorney
General of Florida to seek enforcement of both federal and state
antitrust laws against recreation leases. 9
Condominium owners, bound to recreation leases, were attracted to the antitrust laws because they provided an opportunity
to obtain relief that included cancellation of the lease, treble damages and attorney's fees. Additionally, the antitrust laws provided
access to the federal courts, a welcomed new forum to condominium
owners who had fared poorly in the state courts for nearly a decade."0
55. Id. at 35.

56. Id. at 36.
57. Mailgram from Jimmy Carter to Condo-Coop Executive Council (Feb. 26, 1976),
reprinted in CONDO-CooP COURIER.
58. The Federal Trade Commission, pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1976), has jurisdiction to enforce all antitrust laws, including the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,
235 (1972).
59. See, e.g., Condominium Development and Sales Practices:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the House Comm. on Bankig, Currency
and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 310 (1976)(statement of David Osterer, President, Condominium Executive Council of Florida).
60. See Avila S. Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); Fleeman v. Case, 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1977); Point E. Management Corp. v. Point E. One
Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974); Breslerman
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Thus, despite the setback handed to condominium owners by the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Fleeman, the antitrust laws
generated optimism that legal redress was still available.
This portion of the article will analyze the manner in which
recreation leases are alleged to result in unreasonable restraints of
trade in violation of antitrust laws. Following this analysis, the recent decisions construing the federal and state antitrust implications of recreation leases will be examined. Finally, the continuing
viability of attacks against recreation leases predicated upon antitrust laws will be reviewed, with this author's analysis as to how the
unresolved issues are likely to be decided.
b. Tying Arrangements
Contractual arrangements and combinations which unreasonably restrain trade have long been prohibited by both federal and
state law."' The manner in which condominium owners become obligated to make rental payments under a recreation lease as part of
their purchase of a condominium parcel, and the effect thereof, may
constitute a contractual arrangement which unreasonably restrains
trade. The retraint is predicated upon the concept developed under
the antitrust laws known as an illegal tying arrangement. A tying
arrangement has been defined as an agreement by a party to sell one
product, but only on the condition that the buyer also purchase a
different (the tied) product, or at least agree not to purchase that
product from another supplier." The tying arrangement precludes
free competition in the market for the tied product because the
violator utilizes his economic power to enhance his position in such
a market.
The application of these principles to recreation leases begins
with the assumption that the condominium housing unit offered by
the developer and the recreational facilities provided under the
lease constitute two separate and distinct products. The tying product is the condominium housing unit and the tied product is the
recreation lease. Unquestionably, it has been a prevalent practice
v. Dorten, 320 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); Rosenwasser v. Frager, 307 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d

Dist. 1975); Commodore Plaza at Century 21 Condominium Ass'n v. Saul J. Morgan Enterprises, 301 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), appeal dismissed, 308 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1975); Plaza

Del Prado Condominium Ass'n v. G.A.C. Properties, 295 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974);
Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); Fountainview Ass'n v. Bell, 203
So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), cert. discharged, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
61. At the federal level, the Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted in 1890. The Supreme
Court of Florida subsequently declared contracts in restraint of trade to be void as contrary
to public policy. Stewart v. Steams & Culver Lumber Co., 56 Fla. 570, 48 So. 19 (1908).
62. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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among developers to package and market their product in a tie-in
fashion. 3 In other words, each consumer desiring to purchase a condominium housing unit in a development that had a recreation lease
was required, as a mandatory condition of purchasing that unit, to
become simultaneously obligated to make rental payments under
the recreation lease. Therefore, once it is assumed that the condominium housing unit and recreation lease constitute two separate
products, it is apparent that the developer is agreeing to sell one
product on the condition that the buyer also purchase a different,
or tied, product.
The argument propounded by those claiming an antitrust violation against a developer who ties in a recreation lease to the purchase of a unit is that it results in a two-fold restraint of trade. First,
the condominium owners who are obligated to make payments
under the recreation lease, whether or not they use the recreational
facilities, are deprived of their freedom to purchase recreational
services from other sources which, because of their nature, quality
or price, may be more desirable to that particular condominium
owner. Second, other competitors engaged in the business of selling
recreational facilities or services are deprived of a portion of the
market which would otherwise be available to them. Such a tying
arrangement is injurious to free competition because the condominium developer is able to sell his recreational facilities and services,
not necessarily because they are of higher quality or better prices
than those of other competitors in the recreational facilities business, but because the condominium developer requires the consumer to become obligated under the recreation lease in order to
purchase the condominium housing unit. The applicability of an
illegal tying arrangement to the manner in which recreation leases
are marketed is best understood upon examination of the decisions
in this area rendered by the federal and state courts.
c.

Federal Antitrust Implications

In an effort to preserve free and unfettered competition, the
Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination
. . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States." 4 Of course, all contracts restrain trade to some
extent, and thus the courts have construed the Sherman Antitrust
Act as precluding only those contracts, combinations or conspiracies
63. See W. Bosher, Condominiums: Their Impact on the Southeast Florida Housing
Market (1974)(unpublished Intergovernmental Affairs Fellowship Program report for Rod
Tennyson, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Legal Affairs, State of Florida).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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which "unreasonably" restrain competition. 5 The plaintiff's burden
of demonstrating the "unreasonableness" of a particular contract,
combination or conspiracy is responsible for the complex nature of
most antitrust litigation. To determine the reasonableness of a particular business practice, the court must be presented with detailed
factual information concerning the nature of the business. Through
the years, however, the courts have determined that certain business arrangements are so totally devoid of any redeeming virtue that
they are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. These practices
are classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act. When dealing
with a per se violation, the necessity for a complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine
whether a particular restraint is unreasonable, is avoided. This difficult burden is replaced with the much easier burden of demonstrating that the challenged practice meets the elements of a per se
violation of the Sherman Act."0
In 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
tying arrangement constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. 7 To demonstrate an illegal tying arrangement, a plaintiff must
prove that: (1) there are two separate and distinct products, the
tying product and the tied product; (2) the defendant has sufficient
"economic power" in the tying market to coerce purchase of the tied
product; (3) a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce
is involved in the tied market; and (4) there are anti-competitive
effects in the tied market. 8
As applied to the recreation lease situation, condominium owners must prove that: (1) the condominium housing unit and recreation facilities lease constitute two products;" (2) the condominium
developer has sufficient "economic power" in the condominium
housing market to coerce acceptance of the recreation lease obligation; (3) a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce in the
recreational facilities market is involved; and (4) the arrangement
effects in the recreational facilities market.
has anti-competitive
Developers who are
lessors of recreation leases often contend
that: (1) the condominium apartments and appurtenant recreational facilities constitute a single product defined as a recreational65. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
66. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
67. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
68. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
69. A good discussion of the criteria relevant to a determination of the "single product"
issue can be found in United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559-60 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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residential community; (2) in light of the numerous condominium
developments being constructed in Florida, no developer has sufficient economic power to coerce a purchaser to accept obligations
under an unwanted recreational lease; (3) any effect on the recreational facilities market would, in any event, be entirely "local" in
nature and thus would not involve interstate commerce in the recreational facilities market; and (4) the recreational facilities market
has not suffered any anti-competitive effects as a result of the challenged tie-in.
In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. ' "
[hereinafter referred to as Fortner II], the Supreme Court recently
considered the alleged illegality of a tying arrangement between the
sale of prefabricated homes, the tied product, and credit financing,
the tying product. In this case, the Court clarified its definition of
''economic power" in the tying market which would be sufficient for
the per se standard to apply." A noncompetitive price for the tiedin good is insufficient to support a judgment that "economic power"
exists." In addition, a mere showing that the tying good is offered
on unique terms from those available if the product were purchased
singularly does "not give rise to any inference of economic power."7 3
The crucial test of economic power "focus[es] attention on the
question whether the seller has the power, within the market for the
tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept
burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely com70. 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
71. In the first two Supreme Court decisions on this issue, the Court equated economic
power with "dominance" in the tying market which, in the first case, was predicated upon
the defendant's patent rights to a particular product, International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947), and in the second, was predicated upon the defendant's monopolistic
position in the tying market, Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594
(1953). In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the first case in which land
was asserted as the tying product, the Supreme Court found sufficient "economic power" by
virtue of the defendant's extensive, strategically located and unique land holdings, despite
the fact that the defendant clearly did not monopolize the land market. Subsequently, in
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), Justice Goldberg, writing for the Court,
held that "even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be
inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes." In Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) [hereinafter
referred to as FortnerI], the Supreme Court clarified its earlier holding that "uniqueness"
may create sufficient "economic power" by noting that "only when other competitors are in
some way prevented from offering the distinctive products themselves" can uniqueness confer
sufficient economic power.
72. 429 U.S. at 618. The Court recognized that "[piroof that Fortner paid a higher price
for the tied product is consistent with the possibility that the financing was unusually inexpensive and that the price for the entire package was equal to, or below, a competitive price."
Id. (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 622.
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petitive market."'"
In order for the recreation lease to be an illegal tie-in under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, the condominium market must be
shown to be noncompetitive." This noncompetitive market condition will be difficult to demonstrate in the sale of condominium
units. Condominium owners charging developers with having committed an illegal tying arrangement seek to demonstrate the developer's economic power in the condominium housing market by asserting that the particular developer's condominiums are desirable
to consumers and unique in their attributes because of their location, price and facilities. The condominium owners assert that competitors of the developer are precluded from offering the same distinctive product by arguing that every parcel of land is unique and,
thus, ownership of the land prevents other competitors from offering
the same product to the consumer."
Whether the condominium units represent tying products
which the Court will regard as "sufficiently unique to give rise to a
presumption of economic power"" is unresolved because FortnerII
did not deal with condominiums and mandatory recreation leases.
FortnerII, however, is a strong indication that the present Supreme
Court of the United States will not find "economic power" in the
tying market.
The only federal court decisions concerning the application of
the Sherman Act specifically to mandatory recreation leases have
not dealt with the substantive elements of an illegal tying arrangement which were described above. The peripheral issues which have
been ruled upon as of this date, and which will be discussed herein,
involve the doctrine of abstention, subject-matter jurisdiction, the
ability to state a cause of action under the Sherman Act, standing
to assert the Sherman Act violation and the manner of applying the
statute of limitations.
(i).

Abstention

The abstention doctrine is predicated upon the proposition that
federal courts should abstain from entertaining certain controversies which are more appropriately resolved by the state court sys74. Id. at 620.
75. "In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product." Id.
76. See also Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974)(regarding the requirement that the plaintiff not only demonstrate that the defendant had
sufficient "economic power" but that the defendant used that power to coerce the plaintiff
into accepting the tied product).
77. 429 U.S. at 619.
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tern. The argument that federal courts should abstain from ruling
upon the antitrust implications of a mandatory recreation lease
arises in two ways: first, when unit owners challenge the validity of
a recreation lease simultaneously in the federal and state courts;
and second, when condominium developers assert that Florida's
comprehensive statutory regulation of the condominium industry
bars federal antitrust jurisdiction. The first argument is based upon
the doctrine of abstention as developed by the Supreme Court of the
7 8 The second is predicated upon
United States in Younger v. Harris.
the Supreme Court's antitrust rulings in Parker v. Brown7" and its
progeny."
8 the United States Court of Appeals for
In Miller v. Granados,1
the Fifth Circuit was first confronted with the abstention issue as
it relates to condominium antitrust litigation. In that case, condominium owners challenged a mandatory marlagement agreement as
an illegal tying arrangement. While the federal action was pending,
the defendant-developer filed lien foreclosure actions in state court.
The liens arose from the unit owners' failure to pay the fees required
under the management agreement. The unit owners moved for a
preliminary injunction and stay order to enjoin the developer from
prosecuting the state foreclosure actions.
Following a hearing on those motions, the federal district court
dismissed the complaint in its entirety, relying upon the abstention
doctririe enunciated in Younger.8" The district court stated that the
issues raised by the plaintiffs in the federal court action could be
raised and decided in the pending state court suits. The court opined that in the event federal questions of constitutional dimension
were raised in the state court proceedings and state remedies had
been fully exhausted, a federal action might then be proper. Since
no federal questions of constitutional dimension appeared to exist
at that point, the trial court dismissed the action.8"
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that abstention
would be improper under either the Younger or Parker doctrines."
The court noted that neither the general jurisdictional statute, conferring jurisdiction on federal courts over acts of Congress which
regulate commerce or protect trade and commerce against restraints
78.
79.
80.
Carbide
81.
82.

401 U.S. 37 (1971).
317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Continental Ore Co. v. Union
& Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
529 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 395.

83. Id.
84. Id.
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and monopolies, nor the specific jurisdictional statute, upon which
the Sherman Act claim was based, were predicated upon the existence of constitutional questions. 5 Moreover, the court noted that
the jurisdiction conferred by Congress on federal courts under the
Sherman Act is exclusive. Finally, the court noted that the relief
sought in the federal action-treble damages and injunctive relief-could not be obtained in a state court proceeding in view of the
jurisdictional exclusiveness of the Sherman Act. Consequently, abstention under Younger would not be proper.
The Fifth Circuit also refused to accept the contention that
state action in the realm of condominium regulation bars federal
antitrust jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted
that the threshold inquiry, in determining whether anti-competitive
activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant
to proscribe, is determined by an examination of whether the particular activity is compelled by the state acting as a sovereign or is
merely permitted by that state.8 A review of the Florida Condominium Act reveals that mandatory management agreements are not
required by that Act, although they are permitted. Consequently,
state regulatory action does not preclude applicability of federal
antitrust laws. Since mandatory recreation leases are likewise permitted, but not required, by Florida's Condominium Act,87 it can be
safely assumed that the court's decision in Miller would also apply
to the recreation lease situation. It is now clear that the federal
courts in Florida will not abstain from the consideration of Sherman
Act challenges to mandatory recreation leases.
(ii).

Setting Forth a Cause of Action

Miller also involved the question of whether the allegations
contained in the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action
under the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had conspired, and were continuing to conspire in direct restraint
of trade in the management services market, by requiring the condominium owners to accept obligations under the management
agreement as a mandatory condition of their condominium purchase. 8 The complaint further alleged that the sale of condominium
units, in an amount exceeding forty million dollars, involved interstate commerce through the use of the United States Postal Service,
news and advertising media operating in interstate commerce, sales
85. Id. at 396.
86. Id. See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975).
87. FLA. STAT. § 718.114 (1977).
88. 529 F.2d at 394-95.
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and resales to out-of-state purchasers and the purchase of services,
facilities and materials from out-of-state dealers."s
The defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of
action under the Sherman Act because the sale of only one product
was involved. As with the recreation lease situation, the defendants
took the position that these agreements were integral parts of the
condominium regime. 0 The defendants further asserted that there
were obvious justifications for utilizing mandatory management
agreements in connection with the development and sale of a condominium.'
The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendants' arguments. As to the
single product argument, the court noted that it was premature. In
determining whether a proper cause of action had been stated, the
court assumed the truth of all well pled facts. Consequently, the
mere allegation by the condominium owners that the condominium
housing unit and management contract were two separate and distinct products was sufficient to meet the first element of an illegal
tying arrangement. Whether or not one or two products were involved must be determined at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. " As to the justification argument, the Fifth Circuit pointed out
that this argument misconceived the nature of an antitrust violation, since once a tying arrangement had been found, its illegality
is established without further inquiry into business excuses for its
use. 3 The court noted further that tying arrangements serve no
purpose beyond the suppression of competition because they deny
competitors free access to the market for the tied product. Whether
the party imposing the tying requirement has a better product or a
lower price is not dispositive. 4 The critical factor is the ability of
89. Id. at 395. The allegations relating to sales and resales of condominium units in
interstate commerce are not sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction. These allegations
relate to interstate commerce in the tying product, whereas the court's jurisdiction in a tiein case requires an effect upon interstate commerce in the tied product. Consequently, the
only allegation which properly related to the court's jurisdiction was the allegation regarding
the purchase of services, facilities and materials from out-of-state dealers. Presumably, other
management companies would have increased their interstate purchases since, absent the
illegal tie-in, they would have been able to serve the condominium which had been tied to
the management agreement. For a discussioon of subject-matter jurisdiction, see section V
infra.
90. Id. at 396.
91. Id. The developer argued that it had a legitimate interest in assuring proper management and maintenance of the apartment complex during the active sales program, and that
if each owner were allowed to choose his own managerial services chaos would result.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
93. 529 F.2d at 396 (citing United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)).
94. 529 F.2d at 397.
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the tying firm to retard competition in one market because of its
power or leverage in another market. 5
Miller could, therefore, be relied upon for the proposition that
a complaint sufficiently states a cause of action under the Sherman
Antitrust Act when it is alleged that condominium units and leased
recreational facilities constitute two separate products, that the defendant utilized its economic power in the market for condominium
units to coerce purchasers to accept obligations under the recreation
lease, and that a "not insubstantial" effect on interstate commerce
occurred in the recreational facilities market.
(iii).

Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations applicable to causes of action predicated upon the Sherman Act is four years.9" Since Florida's statutory prohibition against escalation clauses was enacted in 1975,11
many of the recreation lease challenges, which are principally motivated by the effects of the escalation clause, involve leases entered
into more than four years before the antitrust action was commenced. This fact gives rise to the issue of when a cause of action
under the Sherman Act accrues. If it accrues only upon the original
purchase of the condominium-and simultaneous assumption of obligations under the long-term recreation lease, then actions filed more
than four years after that date would be barred. On the other hand,
if a new cause of action accrues each time the lessor of the recreation
lease enforces the lease by collecting or escalating rents, a continuous cause of action exists for the entire term of the recreation lease
and for four years thereafter.
This issue was resolved by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Imperial Point Collonades Condominium v.
95 In Imperial Point, the individual
Mangurian.
plaintiffs had each
purchased their new condominiums and had become obligated
under a ninety-nine year recreational lease more than four years
prior to the date on which the action was filed. The district court,
holding that the cause of action accrued when plaintiffs purchased
the condominiums and joined the recreation lease, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that the action was
barred by the statute of limitations.9
95. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976).
97. 1975 Fla. Laws, ch. 75-61 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 711.465 (1975))(current version
at FLA. STAT. § 718.401 (1977)).
98. 549 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 185 (1977).
99. Imperial Point Collonades Condominium v. Mangurian, 407 F. Supp. 870 (S.D. Fla.
1976).
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Following a lengthy analysis of prior decisions construing the
statutes of limitations as applied to the Sherman Act, the Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that a new cause of action accrues each
time the defendant seeks to enforce the recreation lease provisions.1'0 The court noted, however, that only the damages suffered
in the four years preceding the filing of the action could be recovered
by plaintiffs. 01
The Fifth Circuit's ruling was predicated upon the theory that
a new cause of action arose each time the plaintiffs were injured by
an "act" which is proscribed by the antitrust laws. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the only "act" that could be
challenged was the sale of condominium units with the mandatory
recreation lease, which had occurred more than four years prior to
the filing of the action. Additionally, the defendants argued that
even if collection of rent and increasing the rent pursuant to the
escalation clause constitute new "acts," any injury suffered by
plaintiffs necessarily resulted from the initial prelimitations act of
requiring the condominium purchasers to become obligated under
the lease. 02 The court adopted the position that the defendants
could cease causing the injury to the plaintiffs at any time simply
by not enforcing or collecting benefits under the challenged contractual arrangements. The court further opined that it does not lie well
in the mouth of a defendant to argue that he is immunized from suit
for his recent acts simply because they were authorized by a prelimitations contract, alleged to be unlawful in itself or the product of
an unlawful conspiracy, when the defendant must continue to commit these acts in order to continue reaping the fruits of the alleged
unlawful contract or conspiracy.' 3 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit
reversed the lower court's decision in Imperial Point and reopened
the door to the federal courts to unit owners seeking to rid themselves of recreation lease obligations to which they had been bound
for more than four years.
(iv).

Standing

The only remaining federal appellate decision with regard to
the federal antitrust implications of mandatory recreation leases
involved the issue of standing. 4 Most actions challenging the valid100. 549 F.2d at 1043-44.
101. Id. at 1044.
102. Id. at 1036, 1039.
103. Id. at 1043.
104. Buckley Towers Condominium v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
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ity of recreation leases are brought by condominium associations. In
some cases, these condominium associations are parties to the lease
and in others they are charged with the responsibility of maintaining the recreational facilities and collecting the rents and maintenance fees under the recreation lease for the lessor of the facilities.
Condominium associations generally become parties to the recreation lease in order to prevent the need for the lessor to enter into
individual leases with each condominium owner. Therefore, a master lease is entered into between the lessor and the condominium
association, and each purchaser of a condominium unit, by virtue
of the condominium documents, obligates himself to contribute a
portion of the rent due under the master lease.
In Buckley Towers Condominium v. Buchwald, 10 a condominium association brought suit against a lessor of a recreation lease
on the ground that the mandatory lease constituted an illegal tying
arrangement. The association asserted standing to bring the action
under section 4 of the Clayton Act which creates a private cause of
action for the recovery of treble damages by any person who can
demonstrate that he was "injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.""' The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the association as a
party plaintiff on the ground that the association could not possibly
be injured in its "business or property."'' 7 The court noted that the
condominium association was a nonprofit organization formed
solely to operate, to manage and to maintain the condominium,
including the leased facilities, with all expenses being paid by the
condominium unit owners. 10" In essence, the association acted
merely as a conduit, collecting rent and maintenance fees from the
unit owners and paying rent to the lessor of the recreation lease.
Since the Supreme Court had already construed the terms
"business or property" as referring only to commercial interests or
ventures,'" the nonprofit association could not demonstrate any injury sufficient to confer standing under section 4. Moreover, the
court rejected the association's argument that, even if precluded
from recovering damages, it sufficiently met the standing requirements for injunctive relief set forth in section 16 of the Clayton
105. Id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
107. 533 F.2d at 938. For the district court's opinion see Buckley Towers Condominium
v. Buchwald, 399 F. Supp. 38 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
108. 533 F.2d at 936-37, 937 n.2.
109. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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Act." 0 The association correctly noted that the terms "business or
property" were not contained in section 16, which broadly grants
standing to seek injunctive relief to any person being injured by a
violation of the antitrust laws.
In refusing to grant standing to the association to seek injunctive relief, the Fifth Circuit noted that irrespective of the "business
or property" test, standing under either section 4 or section 16 requires an allegation that the alleged injury proximately resulted
from an antitrust violation."' The court found the basis of the alleged illegal tying arrangement to be the requirement that in purchasing a condominium unit (the tying product), the purchaser was
required as a condition of purchase to become obligated under the
recreation lease (the tied product)."2 The condominium association,
however, did not become a party to the recreation lease by virtue of
the purchase of a condominium. The court observed that the complaint contained no allegation that the condominium association
had purchased a condominium unit. Instead, the association became a party to the lease while controlled by the developer and as
part of the developer's organization of the condominium regime.
Consequently, any injury the association might be suffering by virtue of the recreation lease could not have been the proximate result
of an antitrust violation. The court ruled that the condominium
association lacked standing to assert that the recreation lease constituted an illegal tying arrangement under the Sherman Act."'
(v).

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The determination of a federal court's jurisdiction to entertain
an action predicated upon a violation of the Sherman Act rests upon
the question of whether the defendants' conduct, as alleged, has a
sufficient relationship with interstate commerce so as to be a proper
subject of federal regulation. This jurisdictional issue, although dif110. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-435, Title H, § 302(3), 90 Stat.
1396 (1976).
111. 533 F.2d at 938.
112. Id.
113. The court also rejected the association's argument that it could maintain the action
in a representative capacity on behalf of the condominium owners, all of whom were members
of the association. In so doing, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), regarding the standing of certain organizations and
associations to bring representative actions on behalf of their members, was inapposite. To
bring an action, the association must show that the nature of the claim and the relief sought
do not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the dispute. 533 F.2d at 938 n.3. The court's comment in this regard raises a serious
question as to whether an individual condominium owner could attack a recreation lease
under the Sherman Act in a class action which meets the requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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ficult to distinguish, is different from the element of an illegal tying
arrangement requiring a "not insubstantial" effect upon interstate
commerce. The latter deals with the substantive issue of whether or
not a Sherman Act violation has been proven,"' whereas the former
deals with the initial issue of whether the Congress has the power
to grant the federal courts jurisdiction over the particular conduct
being challenged." 5
To establish jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, plaintiff must
meet one of the two following tests: (1) that the activities in question
occurred in the flow of interstate commerce; or (2) that the activities
complained of, while wholly intrastate in character, have a direct
and substantial effect upon interstate commerce." ' Furthermore,
the second test is not satisfied merely because the challenged acts
affect a business engaged in interstate commerce. Instead, plaintiffs
must allege and prove that the acts complained of affect the interstate part of such a business, and that the effect on interstate commerce is substantial in nature." '
The court decisions which dealt with the abstention doctrine,
stating a cause of action, the statute of limitations and standing,
were all decided on the basis of a complaint. Those issues did not
require factual evidence adduced through affidavits, discovery or
trial. On two occasions, however, federal district courts have gone
beyond the allegations of the complaint to inquire into the question
of subject-matter jurisdiction." ' In both instances the district courts
have dismissed Sherman Act cases attacking mandatory recreation
leases on the ground of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
In Burleigh House Condominium v. Burleigh House, Inc. "I and
Chatham Condominium Association v. Century Village, Inc.,1 0 the
114. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977)
(Fortner I); Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969)
(Fortner/); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
115. See, e.g., Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1323
(N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); Las Vegas
Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
889 (1954).
116. Mandeville Ireland Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948); Sun
Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969); Las Vegas
Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
889 (1954).
117. Lieberthal v. North Country Homes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Atlantic Co.
v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 953
(1950); David Cabrera, Inc. v. Union de Choferes y Duenos, 256 F. Supp. 839 (D.P.R. 1966).
118. Chatham Condominium Ass'n v. Century Village, Inc., No. 75-WPB-166-Civ-WM
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 9,1976); Burleigh House Condominium, Inc. v. Burleigh House, Inc., No. 75112-Civ-CA (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 1976).
119. No. 75-112-Civ-CA (S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 1976).
120. No. 75-WPB-116-Civ-WM (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9,1976).
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federal district courts noted the above principles concerning the
determination of subject-matter jurisdiction and, after applying
those principles to the facts adduced, dismissed the actions for lack
of such jurisdiction. The courts found that the alleged restraints of
trade in the recreational facilities market, where plaintiffs were required to lease certain improved real estate in a given county in
South Florida, were purely local in nature. Although the courts'
orders do not fully recite the factual evidence presented, it appears
that the courts will not find the requisite quantum of interstate
commerce from the fact that the condominium housing units are
sold through instrumentalities of interstate commerce to residents
of various states. The focus of their review will be on the interstate
aspects of the recreational facilities market allegedly being restrained.
It is obvious that the recreational facilities that condominium
owners would patronize, if not bound to the recreation lease, would
be limited to those facilities within a relatively small area surrounding the owners' residence. In other words, condominium owners in
South Florida are not likely to become members of a recreational
services establishment in another state regardless of whether they
are obligated under a recreation lease. As noted earlier, the fact that
a neighborhood recreational service competitor, such as a local
health spa, may be part of an interstate business, is not sufficient
to meet the jurisdictional test. Consequently, it would appear that
in order to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, the condominium
owners would have to establish that the restraint on interstate commerce results from the reduction in interstate purchases of equipment and supplies by local recreational service competitors, whose
business activity is limited by the effects of mandatory recreation
leases. As can be imagined, demonstration of such an impact on
interstate commerce would be quite difficult and, in any event, the
impact would most likely be so insignificant as to fail to meet jurisdictional requirements.'
Although the subject-matter jurisdiction test depends upon the
factual evidence adduced in each particular case, affirmance by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit of either of the
above decisions would present a formidable obstacle for other condominium owners to overcome. This is particularly so in light of the
fact that the Chatham Condominium Association case involved the
largest condominium development in Florida, thus presenting po121. Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969);
cf. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
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tentially the best available factual case. Accordingly, if these decisions are upheld, a severe blow will have been dealt to the condominium owners' ability to seek redress against mandatory recreation
leases under the Sherman Act.
2.

FLORIDA ANTITRUST LAW

The theory that mandatory recreation leases constitute unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws was also
tested in Florida's state courts during the past year. Although the
statutory basis for the state actions was different, the factual allegations giving rise to the alleged violations under Florida law were
based upon the identical circumstances which were alleged to have
given rise to an illegal tying arrangement under the Sherman Act.
Condominium owners asserted that these illegal tying arrangements
violated Florida's laws prohibiting combinations restricting trade or
commerce' as well as the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.' 3 Unlike the majority of federal courts, the Florida state
courts dealt with the merits of the litigation and concluded that
mandatory recreation leases do not constitute illegal restraints of
trade under Florida law.
a.

Chapter 542-Combinations Restricting Trade or Commerce

In Avila South Condominium Association, Inc. v. Kappa
Corp., 4 the condominium association and four individual unit owners suing on behalf of all other persons similarly situated sought, on
several theories, to have a recreation lease declared void. The defendants included three corporations alleged to have been not only the
owners and developers of the tract, building and appurtenances, but
also the owners and lessors of the recreational facilities which were
leased to the association. Additionally, two individuals who were
alleged to have been the original incorporators and directors of the
association at the time it entered into the recreation lease were
named as defendants. One of the counts in the complaint was that
the tie-in of condominium housing units and obligations under the
recreation lease violated section 542.05 of the Florida Statutes
(1975), because the defendants "preclude[d] competitors . . . from
offering the same or similar [recreational] facilities."' 2 5 The trial
court dismissed the count, with prejudice, concluding that certain
122.

FLA. STAT.

§§ 542.01-.13 (1977).

123. Id. §§ 501.201-.213.
124. "347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
125. Id. at 607.
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provisions of the Condominium Act specifically control the general
provisions of chapter 542 and that, accordingly, the count failed to
state a cause of action.' 6 In dismissing other causes of action involved in the Avila case, the trial court initially and directly passed
on the validity of state statutes by construing provisions of the
Florida Constitution. The plaintiffs were, therefore, able to take
their appeal directly to the Supreme Court of Florida.
The supreme court affirmed the final dismissal of the count
predicated upon chapter 542 of the Florida Statutes (1977). Without
much discussion, the court cited the statutory provisions of the
Condominium Act (which the lower court had found to preempt the
general provisions of chapter 542) and concluded that "the trial
court correctly held that tying recreational facilities to housing is at
the heart of the condominium concept, a concept which has been
repeatedly sanctioned both by the legislature and by the courts."'"
b.

Chapter 501-Unfair Trade Practices

Although the Avila decision only construed section 542, its denunciation of the tie-in theory as applied to condominium recreation leases leaves little doubt that actions predicated upon an antitrust theory under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act will meet the same fate. Section 501.204 of the Florida Statutes
(1975), provides that:
(1) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
hereby declared unlawful.
(2) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing
subsection (1) of this section, due consideration and great weight
shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to s. 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)), as from time to time
amended.
Since the federal courts had already interpreted the Federal
Trade Commission Act's prohibition against unfair methods of competition as embracing the activities proscribed by the Sherman
Act, 2' recreation lease opponents asserted that unreasonable restraints of trade similarly constitute unfair methods of competition
under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, commonly known as Florida's Little FTC Act. Based upon this theory,
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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the Attorney General of Florida, as an enforcement authority of the
Little FTC Act, commenced an administrative proceeding challenging a mandatory recreation lease as being in violation of the Little
FTC Act.' 9 The administrative complaint traced the allegations of
an illegal tying arrangement under the Sherman Act to the conclusion that the same constituted prohibited activity under the Little
FTC Act.
The developer, in lieu of defending the administrative action,
sought a writ of prohibition in the District Court of Appeal, First
District, to prohibit the Attorney General from continuing an administrative proceeding challenging the developer's recreation lease
under the Little FTC Act.'30 The developer asserted that the Attorney General was clearly acting in excess of his jurisdiction by virtue
of section 501.212 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which provides, in
pertinent part: "This part does not apply to: (1) an act or practice
required or specifically permitted by Federal or State law." The
developer contended that Florida's Condominium Act specifically
permits mandatory recreation leases and thus this practice was exempt from the coverage of the Little FTC Act. The First District
agreed and, without a written decision, entered an order granting
the writ of prohibition.' 3 ' The Supreme Court of Florida dismissed
the appeal on jurisdictional grounds.'32
129. Cenville Communities, Inc., No. 74-10094 Dep't of Legal Affairs, State of Fla.
130. Cenville Communities, Inc. v. Department of Legal Affairs, No. X-546 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1975).
131. Id.
132. Shevin v. Cenville Communities, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1976). Justice England,
however, noted in a concurring opinion that if the writ of prohibition had been addressed to
an administrative rule promulgated by the cabinet, such as the rule-making authority under
the Little FTC Act, jurisdiction may have existed. Id. at 1282.
Less than one month later, apparently in reliance on Justice England's concurring opinion, the Attorney General, acting pursuant to the Little FTC Act, commenced rule-making
proceedings seeking adoption of proposed chapter 2-24 of the Florida Administrative Code
by the cabinet. See Tie-In Sales in the Sale of Housing Units, Proposed Rule No. 2-24, Fla.
Admin. Weekly, Nov. 5, 1976, at 2. Attempting to codify the elements of an illegal tying
arrangement under the Sherman Act into a rule under the Little FTC Act, the operational
portion of the rule provided that:
It shall be an unfair method of competition and an unfair trade practice for any
developer to directly or indirectly condition the sale of a housing unit upon the
purchaser's acceptance of a recreational services contract under the following
conditions:
(1) The developer has economic leverage over the sale of housing units; and
(2) A restraint of trade has occurred, is occurring, or is likely to occur.
See Proposed Rule 2-24.03, Dep't of Legal Affairs, State of Fla.
Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1975), certain interested persons challenged the validity
of the Attorney General's proposed tie-in rules. While this administrative challenge was still
pending, the supreme court entered its decision in the Avila case, declaring that tying sales
of housing units to recreational facilities was at the heart of the condominium concept and
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Although Florida's Little FTC Act became effective on October
1, 1973, opponents of recreation leases argued that unreasonable
restraints of trade had always been deemed illegal as violative of
Florida's public policy; thus, they argued, challenges to recreation
leases under the Little FTC Act could be made against leases existing prior to the effective date of that Act. It was reasoned that
contracts resulting in unreasonable restraints of trade were always
illegal, and the Little FTC Act merely provided a new remedy and
did not unconstitutionally impair contractual obligations in violation of article I, section 10 of the Constitutions of Florida and the
United States.
In Point East One Condominium Association v. Point East
Developers, "I the District Court of Appeal, Third District, was
asked to review an order of the trial court dismissing a complaint
predicated, in part, upon chapter 501 of the Florida Statutes (1977).
The dismissal as to that count was based upon the lower court's
conclusion that retrospective application of the Little FTC Act
would infringe upon the constitutional prohibition against impairment of the obligation of contracts. The complaint traced the elements of an unlawful tying arrangement as described above. On
appeal, the Third District affirmed the lower court, relying principally on the supreme court's earlier decision in Fleeman v. Case,'34
and ruled that chapter 501 could not operate retroactively to render
the subject recreation lease void.'35
Thus, the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in the Avila
case effectively terminated antitrust challenges to recreation leases
under either chapter 542 or chapter 501 of the Florida Statutes.
Although the supreme court did not elaborate upon its opinion that
the Condominium Act justified tying recreation lease obligations to
the sale of condominium units, it would seem that this holding is
most closely analogous to the single product argument still pending
in the federal courts. Since the condominium form of ownership is
authorized and created solely pursuant to Florida's Condominium
Act, the supreme court's statement that tying recreational facilities
to the sale of condominium units "is at the the heart of the condominium concept" is, in effect, a statutory construction holding that
had been repeatedly sanctioned by both the legislature and courts of this state. In apparent
acknowledgment that the supreme court's decision in Avila with regard to chapter 542 would
be equally applicable to rules under the Little FTC Act, the Attorney General withdrew the
proposed tie-in rules.
133. 348 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
134. 342 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976).
135. 348 So. 2d at 35.
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the condominium apartment and appurtenant recreation facilities
are, in fact, a single product. Viewed as such, it is likely that the
supreme court's interpretation may be heavily relied upon by federal courts in determining the single product question as it comes
up in pending tie-in litigation involving recreation leases. Finally,
the decision in the Point East case, although somewhat moot as to
the state antitrust implications of mandatory recreation leases in
light of the Avila decision, still stands, nevertheless, as important
precedent construing Florida's Little FTC Act.
c.

Unconscionability

In determining that the Florida statute which prohibited escalation clauses in recreation leases 3 ' would have only prospective
application, the supreme court in Point East, just prior to concluding its decision in Fleeman v. Case, noted:
Given the narrow issue presented by these appeals we do not
decide questions as to the validity of these leases on any other
grounds. Thus, although there is reference to the possibility that
in some instances lease arrangements for individual unit owners
may be unconscionable, inequitable or contain other deficiencies
recognized in the law as a basis for judicial invalidation, these
matters are not considered or decided here." 7
As further indication that the supreme court might be favorably
disposed towards entertaining challenges to the validity of recreation leases on grounds of unconscionability, the court, in a footnote
to the above quote, 3 ' made reference to the relevant section of Florida's Uniform Commercial Code.'
In Avila, the supreme court held that the provisions of the
Florida Condominium Act, requiring contracts between condominium associations and developers to be fair and reasonable, 4 0 did
not operate retroactively. This, however, did not bar redress upon a
theory that the lease was unconscionable. In dicta it was suggested,
"[in affirming the dismissal of the count alleging violations of
section 711.66(5)(e), we do not preclude the plaintiffs on remand the
possibility of stating an amended claim of unconscionability, independent of section 711.66(5)(e).""'
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

§ 711.231 (1975)(current version at FLA. STAT. 718.403(8) (1977)).
342 So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1976).
Id. at 818 n.6.
FLA. STAT. § 672.302 (1975).
FLA. STAT. § 711.66(5)(e) (1975)(current version at FA. STAT. § 718.302(2) (1977)).
Avila S. Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 605 (Fla. 1977).
FLA. STAT.
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Following these decisions, the Florida Senate enacted a bill
which created a rebuttable presumption that a recreation lease
which meets the nine criteria set forth in the statute is unconscionable and void.' Similarly, the Attorney General initiated rulemaking proceedings under the Little FTC Act.'
Unlike the antitrust actions, the concept of unconscionability
opens a broader base of attack against recreation leases. Whereas
antitrust challenges are limited to the manner in which the leases
are packaged and sold to the unit owners, the unconscionability
claims include, in addition to the foregoing, the fairness of the terms
of the leases themselves. Thus, unconscionability embraces not only
the commercial setting of the transaction at the time the contract
was made, but also the terms of the recreation leases themselves,
to determine whether they are so unconscionable as to be unenforceable."' Although this most recent theory for challenging recreation
leases is in its incipient stages, two decisions, one administrative
and the other at the circuit court level, have touched upon the
matter.
In Urbanek v. KandeU1,'"I condominium owners defended
against an action to recover rents due under a recreation lease by
asserting that the lease was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The condominium owners introduced evidence sufficient
to prove the existence of the nine factors giving rise to a rebuttable
presumption of unconscionability under section 718.122 of the Florida Statutes (1977). The lower court concluded, following the trial,
that the recreation lease at issue was not unconscionable and that,
even if the unit owners were entitled to the presumption created by
section 718.122, the presumption had been rebutted in this particular case.'" The court went on to note, however, that it was inclined
to hold section 718.122 unconstitutional for the following reasons:
first, by seeking to apply to recreation leases in existence prior to
the effective date of the Act, the statute violated article I, section
10 of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits impairment of contractual obligations; second, the legislature's attempt to
define unconscionability, a term which had been created by and
based upon the inherent powers of courts of equity, constituted an
142. 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-221, § 3 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 718.122 (1977)).
143. See Unconscionable Recreational Service Contracts, Rule No. 2-25, Fla. Admin.
Weekly, May 27, 1977, at 2.
144. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); Mobile American Corp. v. Howard,
307 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
145. No. 75-542-CA (Martin Co., Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 26, 1977).
146. Id. slip op. at 4.
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impermissible incursion into the domain of the judiciary in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers; third, the court considered
the statute to be constitutionally deficient because of "over breadth
and vagueness;" fourth, the statute runs afoul of the constitutional
standards of substantive due process; and fifth, the statute may
constitute the adoption of a prohibitive "rule of practice and procedure" in violation of the supreme court's powers under article V of
the Florida Constitution of 1968.111 In fact, the court's opinion criticized the legislature for attempting to force its political views upon
the judiciary. Thus, while perhaps merely dicta, the only decision
which has considered the applicability of section 718.122 has placed
serious doubt upon the viability of that legislative enactment.
In seeking to promulgate administrative rules regarding unconscionable service contracts, the Attorney General and cabinet
took a different approach than the legislature. The operative portion
of proposed chapter 2-25 merely declares: "It shall be an unfair and
deceptive act or practice for any person to collect or attempt to
collect rental payments or portions thereof under a recreational
services contract which is unconscionable at common law."'' Although the proposed unconscionability rules also contain a section
setting forth the factors which the rule-making power would consider sufficient to demonstrate the unconscionability of any particular recreation lease, the operative portion of the rule would permit
a finding that a lease violates the Little FTC Act only if it is
preceded by a finding that the recreation lease would be deemed
unconscionable at common law. The importance of proceeding in
this fashion, rather than setting forth specific criteria upon which a
finding of unconscionability would be predicated, was to permit the
unconscionability rules to be applied to leases in existence prior to
the adoption of the rules."'
As with the Attorney General's previously proposed tie-in rules,
administrative challenges were filed against the proposed unconscionability rules. 5 ' Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
rules, although already approved by the cabinet, may not become
effective until the administrative proceeding is completed. 5 , The
unconscionability rules were challenged on several grounds in Oriole
Homes Corp. v. Departmentof Legal Affairs, 5 including the follow147. Id. at 5.
148. See Proposed Rule 2-25.03, Dep't of Legal Affairs, State of Fla.
149. See Justification Statement in Support of Proposed Chapter 2-25, Dep't of Legal
Affairs, State of Fla.
150. Oriole Homes Corp. v. Department of Legal Affairs, 42 FDOAH 36 (1977).
151. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4) (1977).
152. 42 FDOAH at 40.
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ing: that retroactive application of the rules would unconstitutionally impair the obligations of contract; that the acts and practices of persons engaged in the development and sale of real estate
interests, such as condominium housing and appurtenant recreation
leases, were exempt from the scope of the Little FTC Act; that the
unconscionability rules violated the doctrine of separation of powers; that the rules sought to prohibit practices specifically permitted
by the Condominium Act, and thus such practices were exempt
from coverage of the Little FTC Act; and that the rules failed to
comply with the rule-making requirements set forth in the Little
FTC Act because they failed to set forth "with specificity" acts and
practices prohibited by the Act.
On November 1, 1977, the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings, sitting as hearing examiner in the proceeding to
determine the validity of the proposed unconscionability rules, entered a partial final order. The Director, citing the Point East
case,' 5 3 concluded that the unconscionability rules, if eventually
made effective, could apply only prospectively because retrospective application would violate the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of the obligations of contract. If that decision is affirmed on appeal, the unconscionability rules would be rendered
ineffectual. Although the partial final order would permit the rules
to operate prospectively, condominium owners seeking to nullify
recreation leases would probably resort to the prospective relief afforded by the Condominium Act's prohibition against contracts
which are not "fair and reasonable," as this standard would appear
to be easier to meet than the doctrine of unconscionability.
d.

Conclusion

As noted earlier, in light of the legislative enactments in Florida
in 1975 amending the Condominium Act, post-1975 recreation
leases are not likely to inspire a great deal of litigation. On the other
hand, thousands of condominium owners remain bound to pre-1975
recreation leases under which the rental obligation continues to escalate. Thus, litigation addressed to reforming or nullifying these
leases is likely to continue. Although the statute of limitations decision in the Imperial Point case permits challenges under the federal
antitrust laws to pre-1975 recreation leases, it appears that the unit
owners will have a difficult time demonstrating the involvement of
sufficient interstate commerce to invoke federal court subjectmatter jurisdiction. Additionally, it is the authors' opinion that if
153. 348 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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decisions on the merits are reached, the federal courts are likely to
conclude that condominium housing units and appurtenant recreational facilities constitute a single product and that, in any event,
condominium developers did not have the quantum of economic
power necessary to commit an illegal tying arrangement. FortnerII
is a strong indication that economic power in the condominium sales
market will not be found. Furthermore, in light of the Buckley decision denying standing to the condominium association to bring an
antitrust action, condominium owners are faced with the difficult
task of filing an action in which each condominium owner is a plaintiff or of convincing the court that class action treatment would be
appropriate.
In the state courts, the Avila case clearly puts to rest the challenges to recreation leases predicated upon antitrust theories. Consequently, the unconscionability theory appears to present the only
remaining viable approach for nullifying or reforming existing recreation leases. Although the Urbanek and Oriole decisions discussed
above were not favorable to the interests of condominium unit owners, the unconscionability litigation is still in its formative stages
and, if the Supreme Court of Florida's references to unconscionability claims were, in fact, hints that the court would look favorably
toward this theory, the unconscionability theory may yet provide
the relief which condominium owners bound to recreation leases
have long sought.
C. Lien Rights
The obligation for payments under a recreation or long term
lease typically rests with each unit owner. Furthermore, the obligation of each owner for his share of the lease payments may be secured by a lien against his unit. The right to enforce these essentially contractual lien rights was recently examined in light of the
homestead exemption of article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution of 1968,151 which protects the head of a household from having
154. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4, provides in pertinent part:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, and no
judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon, except for the payment of
taxes and assessments thereon, obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof, or obligations contracted for house, field or other labor
performed on the realty, the following property owned by the head of a family:
(1) a homestead . ...
It is significant to note that the homestead protection afforded by the Florida Constitution
does not affect the contractual obligation to pay the recreation lease fee, nor does it affect
the validity of the lien as a lien on real property. See Point E. One Condominium v. Point E.
Dev., 348 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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his homestead sold at forced sale for the benefit of a creditor. Although the parameters of the constitutional protection have been
defined, the point at which the lien attaches for the purpose of
ascertaining the applicability of the homestead protection requires
further judicial guidance. Those decisions which deal with the effect
of the homestead protection in this context appear to conflict.
Where lien rights are created by contract or operation of law
prior to the time the unit owner established the homestead character of its property, the constitutional protection is not contravened
by enforcement of the lien. In Avila, "Ithe Supreme Court of Florida
rejected a claim by both an association and a unit owner that the
lessor's lien rights violated the homestead protection. The plaintiffs
argued that the lien rights which secured payment of an owner's
share of the lease rents would subject an owner's unit to forced sale
upon default and foreclosure. Having determined that the lien was
created upon the filing of the declaration of condominium, the supreme court held that in all instances the homestead character of
an owner's unit in the condominium would have been created subsequent to the creation of the lien since the Condominium Act requires the declaration of condominium to be filed prior to sale of the
units. 5 ' Accordingly, the claim predicated upon the homestead exemption was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
The supreme court's determination that the lien was created
upon the filing of the declaration of condominium offers an interesting comparison with the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
decision in Gersten v. Bessemer.57 In Gersten, a subdivision developer's lien for recreational use fees contained in a recorded declaration of restrictions was found to have been contractually created at
the time of the delivery of the deed, not upon the recordation of the
declaration. 8' Since the homestead was established at the time of
the conveyance of title, the homestead exemption and the lien rights
attached simultaneously.. Under these circumstances, the homestead exemption was given priority to prevent enforcement of the
lien. Although the purchase contract provided for the owner's obligation to pay the recreational use fee, the first contractual reference
to the lien rights reserved in the declaration was contained in the
Although a creditor cannot foreclose his lien against homestead property, the lien remains as an encumbrance against the property on which it is filed so as to require satisfaction
at the time of sale or financing. Additionally, should a loss of homestead status occur, the
lien could then be foreclosed.
155. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).

156. Id. at 605.
157. 352 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
158. Id. at 70.
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deed. The deed made reference to the Declaration of Restrictions.
Notwithstanding that the owners, prior to closing, were on constructive notice of the rights and restrictions of the recorded declaration,
the lien rights contained therein were not created by contract or by
operation of law until the conveyance of title.'59
The point at which the Fourth District recognized the attachment of the lien appears to differ from that of the supreme court in
Avila, where a recreational lease lien arose at the time of the declaration of condominium's recording. The supreme court did not indicate whether the purchase agreements, which were executed by the
purchasers prior to closing, made reference to either the lessor's lien
right or to the recorded declaration of condominium. Under such
circumstances, the result would have been reconcilable with the
Fourth District's decision because the lien might have been contractually created at the time of the purchase agreement.10 Nevertheless, it would appear that a conflict exists between the Fourth District and the supreme court on the point at which a lien right attaches in circumstances where the right is contained in a recorded
declaration of condominium or restrictions to which all subsequent
conveyances are subject.''
D.

Title to Demised Property

Prior to the supreme court's decision in Avila, challenges to
recreation leases could be maintained where, through poorly drafted
or ambiguous provisions in the condominium documents, the property demised under the lease was, in actuality, declared to be part
of the condominium property.0 2 In Avila the supreme court elimi159. Id.
160. The disclosure provisions of the Condominium Act, since its 1974 amendment,
require that a contract for the sale or lease of a unit that is subject to a lien for rent payable
under a recreation or facilities lease contain a boldface or capital letter reference to such lien
rights and the prospect of foreclosure upon default. FLA. STAT. § 718.503(1)(f) (1977). This
same conspicuous disclosure must also appear in the developer's prospectus or offering circular. Id. § 718.504(8)(d).
161. On rehearing, the Fourth District certified a question to the Supreme Court of
Florida on whether a lien for nonpayment of lease rents can be created prior to the conveyance
of title by recording a declaration of restrictions. The supreme court has taken jurisdiction
on certiorari. Presumably, the conflict is under review.
162. In Ackerman v. Spring Lake, 260 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972) a challenge to a
recreation lease was successful where it was shown that the leased property was declared to
be condominium property and committed to the condominium form of ownership for the
period of the lease. Although fee title was retained by the lessor, the property was brought
within the common elements and precluded the developer's ability to lease the some property
to unit owners in the condominium.
A developer's inadvertent classification of retained property as a common element occurred in Daytona Dev. Corp. v. Berquist, 308 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), where the
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nated the viability of the cause of action. The condominium association and unit owners brought the action in their individual capacities and as representatives of a class of other unit owners for the
purpose of challenging the lessor's title to the recreational units that
were demised under the recreation lease. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of this cause of action, determining
that the association and its members were incapable of challenging
the lessor's title to property demised under the lease.
The supreme court, relying upon the well established principle
that lessees are estopped from denying the lessor's title, found the
association to be without the right to maintain the cause of action."3
In further support of the trial court's dismissal, the court cited
Reibel v. Rolling Green Condominium Association"4 and
Commodore Plaza at Century 21 Condominium Association v. Saul
J. Morgan Enterprises,65 wherein it was established that, since the
common elements are owned in common by the unit owners, the
association is not the real party in interest to maintain an action
challenging the lessor's title to the leased property.' 6
Since the unit owners were, in effect, sublessees, whose rights
with regard to the lease were derived from, and were coextensive
with, the rights of the association, the same reasoning that barred
maintenance of the action by the association served to bar the unit
owners from stating a cause of action.'67 The supreme court applied
and preserved traditional notions of landlord-tenant law in this area
of lease litigation. In so doing, it has effectively eliminated attempts
by unit owners to argue that the property demised under the recreation lease was, in fact, declared to be part of the condominium
property.
In Sauder v. Harbour Club Condominium, " the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, preserved a developer's right to receive
developer's failure to have the declaration of condominium assign a percentage interest of the
common elements to the demised property was a fatal defect in the developer's effort to retain
title to this property. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment quieting title to the property in the unit owners. The Second District did
not, however, comment on the obligation to make payments -under the use agreements relating to these recreational units. Subsequently, the continuing obligation to pay the rent was
established in Sauder v. Harbour Club Condominium No. Three, 346 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1977).
163. 347 So. 2d 599, 603 (Fla. 1977).
164. 311 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
165. 301 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), case dismissed, 308 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1975).
166. It is notable that in neither Reibel nor Commodore Plaza did the District Court of
* Appeal, Third District, preclude individual unit owners from maintaining the action as real
parties in interest.
167. 347 So. 2d at 603.
168. 346 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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rental payments under a use agreement, notwithstanding a prior
adjudication which had vested title to a major portion of the recreational property in the condominium unit owners. Pursuant to an
overall development plan, the developer constructed three separate
buildings, each of which was a separate condominium with a separate declaration of condominium and condominium association.
Recreation rooms were provided in two of the three condominiums.
Notwithstanding the individual integrity of each condominium,
each declaration provided for the use of all recreation facilities by
all unit owners, regardless of the building in which their units were
located. This right was further preserved by a recreation area use
agreement between the developer and each condominium association.
The dispute was based in part upon a prior action in which one
condominium association prevailed in having title to the recreation
unit in its building declared a portion of the common elements,
owned in common by the unit owners of that particular condominium. ' 9 As a result of this prior adjudication and the association's
act of denying the use of its recreational facilities to the owners of
the condominium in which no such facilities existed, suit was
brought by the affected condominium, through the association, to
cancel the recreation use agreement. The trial court, construing the
recreation use agreement to be the equivalent of a lease, cancelled
the use agreement under which the condominium association was
obligated to the developer for rental payments. The trial court reasoned that since the prior adjudication established ownership of a
major portion of the recreational facilities in the owners of one of
the other condominiums, the lease failed in its entirety.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, rejected the trial court's view of the use agreement as a lease and
reversed its cancellation, even though title to the recreational unit
had not vested in the developer. 710 Furthermore, the association's
rental obligation was not properly extinguished. The fact that the
developer did not own the recreational unit was not dispositive of
the issues of continued use rights and rental obligations. Rather, the
issues were determined on the basis of an enforcement of the obligations contained in the respective declarations and use agreements
to which all unit purchasers were subject.17 '
Each purchaser knew or should have known that the overall
development plan guaranteed to all owners use rights to each recrea169. Daytona Dev. Corp. v. Berquist, 308 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
170. 346 So. 2d at 559.
171. Id. at 560.
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tional unit, regardless of the condominium in which it was located.
Once the use rights were established and preserved, the court enforced the developer's right to receive rental payments without regard to whether the property subject to the use agreements was
owned by the developer.
The formula for calculating rent under a recreation lease can
take into consideration property not subject to the lease and not
owned by the developer-lessor. In Gundlach v. Marine Tower
Condominium,'72 a condominium association challenged the right of
a developer to collect recreation lease rents where the rental formula
was based, in part, upon parking spaces within the condominium
property. The description of the leased property included a parking
garage which extended into the condominium building.
The association contended that since the property described in
the lease did not include any portion of the condominium building,
the lessor could not charge rent for that portion of the parking
garage that extended into the building. Despite the lessor's argument that no rent was charged for this portion of the parking garage
but rather, that the collective rent under the lease was based upon
a formula which included the parking spaces within the building,
the trial court determined that the spaces were improperly included
within the rent formula. The trial court assessed damages against
the lessor in the amount of past rent charged for such spaces.
On the lessor's appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed the trial court's final judgment, holding that the
formula for computing rent could include nonlease property.' The
fact that title to a portion of the property included in the formula
was vested in the unit owners was of no significance.
E. Self-Dealing by Developer Controlled Associations
Ever since the District Court of Appeal, Third District, decision
in Fountainview Association v. Bell,'74 challenges to recreation
leases or management contracts have consistently been unsuccessful where the claim was predicated upon the execution of the lease
or contract by association officers or directors who, at the time of
execution, were also officers or directors of the developing entity.'75
172. 338 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
173. Id. at 1101.
174. 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967), cert. discharged, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968)..
175. Point E. Management Corp. v. Point E. One Condominium Corp., 282 So. 2d 628
(Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974); Commodore Plaza at 21 Condominium Ass'n
v. Saul J.. Morgan Enterprises, 301 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), case dismissed, 308 So.
2d 538 (Fla. 1975); Plaza Del Prado Condominium Ass'n v. GAC Properties, Inc., 295 So. 2d
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Typically, the lease or contract obligation would be assumed by the
association at a time when all units were owned by the developer.
In all such cases, the officers' or directors' conduct which served to
benefit the developing entity was alleged to be a breach of their
fiduciary relationship to subsequent unit owner members of the
association. In all instances, judicial refusal to give credence to the
claim was based, in major part, upon the fact that at the time of
the obligation's assumption, there were no members to whom the
association's officers and directors owed a duty.
In Avila South Condominium Association v. Kappa Corp., '
the Supreme Court of Florida reexamined the rights and attendant
remedies of the association and unit owners in the context of selfdealing. The court departed from strict adherence to the principles
that completely barred the maintenance of the claim and permitted
a cause of action based upon undisclosed self-dealing accompanied
by unjust enrichment. In Avila, the condominium association and
a group of owners sued the association's officers and directors who,
on behalf of the association, had executed a recreational lease with
the developer-lessor while also holding official positions with the
developer-lessor. Plaintiffs charged that these individuals breached
their fiduciary duty to the association and its members by having
the association assume a contractual undertaking favorable to
themselves in their lessor and developer capacities and unfavorable
to the unit owners to whom they owed a fiduciary duty.
Consistent with the principles derived from the prior decisions,
the trial court dismissed this cause of action. On review, the Supreme Court of Florida reexamined the view'77 expressed in Point
East Management Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp.78
In Avila, the supreme court followed Point East Management
insofar as it conceded that self-dealing by an association's officers
and directors, without more, is not actionable. The supreme court,
however, clarified the distinction that undisclosed self-dealing for
inordinate personal gain is subject to challenge.17 The supreme
court stated that it could not recommend a rule of law which might
encourage a secret betrayal by persons in a position of trust in order
to reap inordinate personal gain.'80 As a result of the reexamination
718 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974)(per curiam); Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d Dist.

1968).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
Id. at 607.
282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
347 So. 2d at 607.
Id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:875

of Point East Management and the decisions on which it was based,
the court determined that
any officer or director of a condominium association who has
contracted on behalf of the association with himself, or with another corporation in which he is, or becomes substantially interested, or with another for his personal benefit may be liable to
the association for that amount by which he was unjustly enriched as a result of his contract. However, no director or officer
shall be required to return any portion of moneys paid by the
association where it is shown that he received the funds with the
consent of the association or with the consent of a substantial
number of the individuals comprising the association.181

Although it would appear that the remedy would be limited to
a money judgment in the amount by which the self-dealing party is
unjustly enriched, the court did not preclude the trial judge's discretion to grant other relief as equity dictated. Furthermore, since the
cause of action lies in equity, an appropriate equitable resolution of
the issue may be made by the court.
The relevant inquiry is directed toward consent, which will
invariably be a function of disclosure. Although disclosure of the
obligations assumed by the association has always been a major
factor in the consistent judicial sanction of these arrangements, the
supreme court's decision in Avila may require more than mere disclosure of the contractual undertaking itself. Rather, what would
apparently be required to insulate the developer is a disclosure of
the fact that the lease or management contract was executed by the
association at a time when its officers and directors were also officers, directors or principals of the developer. A more cautious developer might expand the disclosure to include not only the names of
the association's officers and directors, which are customarily contained in the articles of incorporation, but also the officers and
directors of the developing corporation and the interrelationship
that exists between one group and the other.

IV.

ENFORCEMENT OF DECLARATION OF CONDOMINIUM

A. Introduction
Condominium owners are in a unique situation as owners of real
property. Unit owners live in close proximity to each other and share
the benefits, obligations and responsibilities of owning in common
real property and its improvements. The right of the individual
181. Id.
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owner to the unregulated use and enjoyment of his unit must often
be compromised because of this unique situation.'82 All unit purchases are made subject to the declaration of condominium, the
provisions of which assume the stature of covenants running with
the land'8 3 and represent a method of private control over the use of
real property. It is not uncommon for a declaration of condominium
to regulate the manner by which an owner may use his unit and
enjoy common property. An owner's right to lease or otherwise convey his unit is typically subject to restriction. The conflict that
arises between the individual unit owner and such restrictions governing the condominium generally centers upon the condominium
association, the entity responsible for the administration of the condominium and the enforcement of the declaration of condominium.' In resolving these conflicts, the courts have not been reluctant to strictly enforce the covenants and restrictions contained in
the governing declaration of condominium.
B.

Leasing and Transfer of Units

The courts have consistently upheld restrictions on an owner's
right to lease or to convey his unit. In all such instances, however,
the restrictions have been specifically grounded in the provisions of
the declaration to which all unit purchases were subject. In each
case, the restrictions were not considered unreasonable when viewed
in the context of the condominium's peculiar need for a system to
promote a cohesive and comfortable living arrangement for all of its
owners.
Illustrative of this consistent judicial enforcement are those
decisions which enforce restrictions on an owner's right to lease his
unit. In Kroop v. Caravelle Condominium, Inc., 115 the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, upheld a restriction limiting to one occa182. The compromise was aptly noted by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
in Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975). In supporting the right of an association to pass rules prohibiting the use of alcoholic beverages in
portions of the common elements, the court commented:
It appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that
to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind of the majority of the unit
owners since they are living in such close proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which
he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property. Condominium
unit owners comprise a little democratic sub society of necessity more restrictive
as it pertains to use of condominium property than may be existent outside the
condominium organization.
Id. at 181-82.
183. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(7) (1977).
184. Id. § 718.103(2).
185. 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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sion an owner's right to lease his unit during the course of his ownership. The court concluded that the limitation was neither unreasonable nor an unlawful restraint on alienation. 86 The unit owner had
contended that the leasing restriction violated the Condominium
Act and impermissibly infringed upon his rights of alienation and
his constitutional right to own, to possess and to enjoy property.'87
The Third District found no error in the trial court's conclusion that
the restriction, having been added to the declaration by amendment, was valid and enforceable. 88
More recently, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
reached the same conclusion upon reviewing a trial court determination that a leasing restriction was an unlawful restraint on alienation. In Seagate Condominium Association, Inc. v. Duffy, 8' the
Fourth District refused to classify restrictions against an owner leasing his unit for business or investment purposes or for periods less
than four months as an unlimited or absolute restriction, characteristic of an unlawful restraint on alienation.' It is notable that the
leasing restrictions were incorporated into the declaration by an
amendment approved by a nearly unanimous vote of unit owners.'
In both Kroop and Seagate, the courts summarily enforced restrictions against an owner leasing his unit. It is significant, however,
that in both cases, the courts enforced specific limitations contained
in the declarations as they existed at the time of an owner's purchase or as they were lawfully amended with the voting participation of all owners.
Restrictions on the manner in which an owner may convey title
to his unit are also common mechanisms of internal control within
the condominium. An owner desiring to convey title to his unit
generally must first obtain the consent of the condominium association for the transfer to the prospective purchaser. As a means to
ensure prompt and reasonable exercise of its authority, many declarations provide that upon the association's disapproval of the prospective purchaser, the association must purchase the unit on equal
terms or provide a purchaser within a prescribed period of time.19
An owner's right to compel the association to purchase or provide a
purchaser does not arise solely upon an association's refusal to ap186. Id. at 309.

187. Id. at 308.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
anese v.

Id. at 309.
330 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
Id. at 486.
Id. at 484.
The limitations imposed by such an approval mechanism were first upheld in ChiCulley, 397 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
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prove the prospective purchaser. According to the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, in Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 13 an
owner cannot assert the obligation of the association to purchase or
to provide a purchaser until the association has withheld approval
of an applicant who on the face of his application qualifies for membership." 4 Notwithstanding a restriction in the declaration prohibiting occupancy by minors less than twelve years of age, a unit owner
submitted a prospective purchaser for approval whose application
revealed two children below the minimum age. The association denied the application and refused the owner's demand that the association purchase the unit or provide a purchaser. The Second District concluded that the only circumstance in which such a demand
could be made is one in which the association has disapproved an
applicant who appears to satisfy the requirements of condominium
ownership. The court noted that any other construction of the declaration's provision would permit abuse of the association's obligation
to purchase or to provide a purchaser where an applicant's approval
is denied." 5
The validity of the age restriction was only briefly discussed by
the Second District in Coquina Club.'" The court concluded that
the age restriction was valid, noting that the Condominium Act
permitted the declaration to contain reasonable restrictions on use
and occupancy.' 7 More recently, however, a constitutional challenge to similar age restrictions was squarely presented to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Franklin v. White Egret
Condominium.'"s In Franklin, an age restriction prohibiting occupancy by minors below the age of twelve was found by the Fourth
District .to have impermissibly infringed upon the owner's constitutional right to marry and to procreate, in violation of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States.' In opposition to an owner's transfer of an interest in his unit, the condominium association contended that the grantee's use of the unit would
conflict with the declaration's age restriction. In a suit to enforce
compliance with the restriction and to set aside the conveyance, the
trial court granted the relief requested by the association.0 0
193.
194.
195.
196.
appeal.
197.
198.
199.
200.

342 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
Id. at 114.
Id.
It is not clear from the decision whether the restriction's validity was an issue on
FLA. STAT. § 718.104(5) (1977).
No. 76-1535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Aug. 9, 1977).
Id. slip op. at 6.

Id.
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The issue of the restriction's validity was central inasmuch as
the only reason expressed for the association's opposition to the
transfer was noncompliance with the age restriction. Without any
significant discussion or analysis, the Fourth District held the age
restriction in violation of the fundamental constitutional right to
marry and to procreate. The court's analysis was limited to citation
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Loving
2 and Skinner v.
v. Virginia,2"' Griswold v. Connecticut"'
Oklahoma.20 3 It is, however, curious to note that the court does not

discuss the presence of any state action sufficient to invoke the
protections of the due process and equal protection clauses of the

24
fourteenth amendment. 0

C. Assessments
An assessment is an owner's share of the funds required to pay
for the common expenses associated with the administration and
operation of the condominium."' ° The recorded declaration of condominium must establish each owner's percentage or fractional
share of common expenses."'8 The amount of the assessment is de201. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
202. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
203. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
204. The essential dichotomy between state and private action appears to have been
ignored. Absent the state action link to the fourteenth amendment, the analogy to the Supreme Court's decisions in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 533 (1941), is weak. In Loving, the
central issue was whether Virginia's statutory prohibition against marriages on the basis of
race violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court found the statute to invidiously discriminate on the basis of race and to strike at the
heart of the right to marry. 388 U.S. at 11-12. In Griswold, the Connecticut statute making
unlawful the use of any drug or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception, or the
assistance of anyone in that regard, was held to infringe upon constitutional rights of privacy.
381 U.S. at 485. Similarly, impermissible state action was found in Skinner where Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was found lacking in equal protection. 316 U.S.
at 538. Central to all decisions, however, was the presence of state action through state
regulatory schemes.
A stronger case may have been made by the Fourth District had the court relied on
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In that case, the Supreme Court held that purchasers
of real property were denied equal protection of the law by judicial enforcement of a private
racially restrictive covenant. If an age restriction covenant is found to be an impermissible
infringement upon an owner's fundamental right to procreate, then judicial enforcement of
such a private agreement constitutes state action and deprives the owner of equal protection
of the law.
205. FLA. STAT. § 718.103(1) (1977).
206. Id. § 718.104(4)(g). In addition to allocating an owner's share of common expenses,
the declaration must also specify an owner's undivided interest in the common elements and
common surplus in a percentage or fractional share. Id. § 718.104(4)(f)-(g). Although it is
probable that an owner's share of ownership in common elements and common surplus will
be the same as his share of common expenses, such an equivalence was not always required
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termined by applying each owner's percentage or fractional share to
the total common expenses incurred by the condominium association. This proportion or percentage of sharing in common expenses
has assumed a protected position and, in the absence of a provision
of the declaration to the contrary, it cannot be altered without con20 7
sent of the owner.
In Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Association,"° the
District Court of Appeal, Second District, invalidated an association's attempt to consolidate the budgets of separate condominium
sections within a multi-section condominium development where
the consolidation had the effect of reallocating an owner's share of
common expenses. 09 Within a single complex, each of seven separate condominiums, while sharing use and responsibility for a specific portion of the complex's property, had common elements
owned and used exclusively by owners of units in that particular
condominium. Each condominium's expenses for its common elements were allocated only to its owners pursuant to a separate
budget. The association responsible for the management of all of the
condominiums adopted a resolution in which it determined that the
allocation of the total of the common expenses of all of the condominiums to each owner would benefit the overall management and
administration of the development.
In an apparent attempt to avoid the prohibition against alteration of the pro rata common expenses without owner consent, the
association argued that its management control over all of the condominiums included the authority to consolidate the budgets. In
reversing the trial court's approval of the alteration of the formula
by which owners share in common expense, the Second District
found that the intent of the declarations was to maintain separate
condominiums despite a consolidation under one source of management."'0 Of further significance was the fact that the change was
implemented by association resolution and without formal consent
by owners or amendment of the declaration."'
by the Condominium Act. However, effective July 1, 1975, FLA. STAT. § 711.14(2)-(4) (Supp.
1974)(current version at FA. STAT. § 713.104(4)(g)(1977)), required that in a residential
condominium, assessments for common expenses must be made against owners in the same
proportion or percentage of ownership as common elements and common surplus.
207. FLA. STAT. § 718.110(4) (1977). Even prior to this statutory protection, the District
Court of Appeal, Second District, had held an amendment which altered the percentage of
sharing in common expenses unenforceable against an owner who refused to consent to the
.change. Thiess v. Island House Ass'n, 311 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
208. 351 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
209. Id. at 757.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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It is not uncommon for a condominium developer to find himself in a position of paying assessments used, in part, to support
legal actions against himself. The typical situation is where a developer has relinquished control of the association to the unit owners
at a time when units remain unsold and owned by the developer.
The association decision to maintain, for any reason, a legal action
against the developer may bring the expenses for such litigation
within the scope of the common expenses shared by all unit owners,
including the developer as the owner of all unsold units. In Margate
Village Condominium Association v. Wilfred, Inc.,"' the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held a developer responsible for
assessments which included the expenses of litigation brought by
the association against the developer."' In further response to the
developer's complaint for injunctive relief with regard to the proposed assessment, the Fourth District indicated that the proper
time to challenge assessments is when the assessment is enforced.,
V.

DEVELOPER-BUILDER LIABILITY

A. Implied Warranty of Fitness and Merchantability
The doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of residential real
property by a builder-vendor in Florida was laid to rest in Gable v.
Silver,"' in which the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
extended an implied warranty of fitness and merchantability to the
sale of new homes and condominiums." 6 Under the implied warranty theory adopted in Gable, a claim could be brought only by a
purchaser of a new home from the builder and recovery would be
conditioned upon the purchaser's proof that the house or condominium was defective when sold."1 ' Although the scope of the war212. 350 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
213. Id. at 17.
214. Id. at 18.
215. 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th Dist.), aff'd, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972).
216. Id. at 18.
217. Id. at 17. The limits on the extension of the implied warranty were clearly marked.
Although the court questioned the propriety of artificially limiting the warranty's extension,
the extension was limited to first purchasers of new homes or condominiums. It is notable,
however, that the Fourth District has, on two occasions, sanctioned the ability of a condominium association to maintain a breach of implied warranty claim on behalf of its members,
including remote purchasers, with regard to common element construction deficiencies. Imperial Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); Wittington
Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Braemar Corp., 313 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975). In
neither case did the court deal squarely with the issue of whether the implied warranty
extended beyond first purchasers to subsequent owners. Responding to the developer's contention in Imperial Towers that the class would include both purchasers from the developer
and purchasers of units on resale, the Fourth District commented that subclasses could be
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ranty's extension has remained largely unchanged since the Gable
decision in 1972,218 the manner in which the implied warranty has
been defined and applied has undergone some development.
One approach is embodied in David v. B&J Holding Corp.,21
in which the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that a
builder-developer impliedly warranted to the purchasers of condominium units that the units would be constructed in accordance
with the plans and specifications on file with the municipality's
building department.22 By equating the concepts of fitness and
merchantability to compliance with filed plans and specifications,
the Third District may have significantly altered the basis of liability under the implied warranty theory.
Plaintiffs were purchasers of a condominium unit from the
defendant-developer. Subsequent to taking title to their unit, they
discovered that the developer failed to provide sound proofing and
insulation in the party walls, according to the plans and specifications on file with the building department. 21 Although the developer
had reserved the contract right in the purchase agreements to make
changes in the plans and specifications, the exercise of this right was
not evidenced by a change filed and approved by the building de22
partment."
created for determining damages. 338 So. 2d at 1084. In Wittington, the Fourth District did
not decide whether the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability extended to remote
purchasers. In discussing the standing of the association to maintain the implied warranty
claim on behalf of its members, the court noted that Gable limited the extension to first
purchasers of new units from the developer. 313 So. 2d at 468 n.5. It appears, therefore, that
neither Wittington nor Imperial Towers altered or extended the implied warranty beyond the
limits established in Gable.
218. The Florida Legislature has adopted a series of implied warranties that extend not
only from the developer to the purchaser, but also from the contractor, subcontractors and
suppliers to the purchaser. FLA. STAT. § 718.203 (1977) implies warranties of fitness and
merchantability made by the developer as to: (1) the unit; (2) personal property; (3) the roof
and structural components; and (4) other property and improvements. Although § 718.203
became effective on January 1, 1977, its warranties would not affect a condominium: (1) on
which construction commenced prior to July 1, 1974; (2) where at least 10% of the units were
under contracts for sale prior to July 1, 1974; or (3) where an insurance program, approved
by the Department of Insurance, has been provided which is of equal or greater warranty than
the statute. Unlike the common law implied warranty, the legislative scheme is defined and
extended according to the nature of the property and from whom the warranty is to run.
Furthermore, it extends an implied warranty from contractors, subcontractors and suppliers,
all of whom previously did not warrant their performance to purchasers of units. Id. § 718.203
is the current codification of FLA. STAT. § 711.65 (Supp. 1974). Noticeably absent from this
replacement is the prior legislative determination that the implied warranties enumerated
in the statute inured "to the benefit of each owner and his successor owners." Id.
219. 349 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
220. Id. at 678.
221. Id.at 677.
222. Id. at 678.
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It is significant that on a theory of breach of implied warranty
the court did not expressly require, as a predicate to liability, that
the modification or variance result in a defect which renders the
unit either unfit for its intended use or unmerchantable. Perhaps
this prerequisite is implied in the decision. Presumably, nonmaterial modifications, which neither create a defective condition nor
measurably affect the value of the unit, would not support a damage
award.
While the Third District's concept of liability may permit a
simple showing of a deviation (however technical and insignificant)
from the filed plans and specifications, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, has assumed a different posture with regard to
establishing a breach of the implied warranty. In Putnam v.
2 3 the
Roudebush,"
Second District reversed a jury verdict for the
purchaser on a claim of breach of implied warranty where the evidence did not establish, on an objective basis, that the condominium unit was not reasonably fit for use as living quarters.22 The
purchaser's claim against the developer was grounded upon alleged
air conditioner noise. The purchaser's evidence established that his
sensitivity to noise rendered the unit uninhabitable. The evidence,
however, did not establish that the unit failed to meet ordinary and
reasonably expected standards. 5 Furthermore, the jury's verdict
was not based upon testimony of a diminution in value of the unit.2
The Second District's concept of the implied warranty of fitness
and merchantability conditions liability upon an objective showing
that the unit is unfit for its intended use. The standard is far removed from the mere showing of a deviation from the plans and
specifications on file with the appropriate building department, but
is more closely aligned with the implied warranty principles first
recognized in the products liability area.22 7 Furthermore, the Second
District's application of the implied warranty principles developed
in products liability litigation included a recognition of the defense
that the aggrieved party had a reasonable opportunity to discover

the defect and failed to do S0.28
223. 352 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).

224. Id. at 910.
225. Id.

226. Id. In fact, the court noted that the evidence offered at trial established that the
value of plaintiff's unit had increased in value since the purchase. Id. Apparently, the purchaser must show that the value of the unit was measurably affected by the defect notwithstanding any increase in value as a result of inflation or other factors affecting value.
227. The standard applied in the area of product sales has been characterized as reasonable fitness. See Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 238 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970);
Wisner v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 167 So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).

228. Putnam v. Roudebush, 352 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977)(citing Lambert v.
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B.

Sale and Purchase of Units

Prior to and during the course of construction, the developer,
through advertising and sales efforts, may make oral and written
representations as to facilities, improvements and other features of
the development. The alteration or omission of these representations typically gives rise to disputes between the contract purchaser
and the developer. The condition of a unit at the time of closing may
also give rise to disputes affecting a purchaser's willingness to take
title to the unit. Depending upon the contract rights between the
parties and the circumstances of the dispute, a purchaser may have
a claim for breach of contract, fraud or specific performance.
In Mirenda v. Steinhardt,229 a purchaser was held to have
waived any claim for fraud where he was informed of, and failed to
object to, a change that may have altered prior representations
regarding an unobstructed view from the unit. The purchaser testified that the decision to purchase the unit was based upon verbal
and written representations that his unit's location would provide
an unobstructed view of the Intracoastal Waterway. Prior to the
scheduled closing, the developer notified, by letter, all affected purchasers that their view may, in fact, be obstructed. The purchaser's
failure to object or to inquire further, in addition to the act of completing the contract, combined to waive any fraud claim
based upon
30
the representation concerning the apartment's view.1

A developer's failure to offer proof substantiating its claim that
a unit, subject of a prior purchase agreement, had been conveyed
to a third party bona fide purchaser for value resulted in a decree
for specific performance in favor of the prior contract purchaser. In
Henderson Development Co. v. Gerrits,3 ' the plaintiff had entered
into an agreement with a condominium developer for the purchase
of a particular unit. The purchaser inspected the unit prior to the
scheduled closing and discovered certain deficiencies. The purchaser expressed his unwillingness to close the transaction until the
deficiencies were corrected. The purchaser did not attend the closing, and the developer subsequently conveyed title to a third
party.2

32

Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1952) and Fletcher Co. v. Melroe Mfg. Co., 238 So. 2d 142 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1970)). Whether a purchaser has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the defect
will undoubtedly depend upon the nature of the defect and the facts and circumstances of
each case.
229. 350 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 4th Dis. 1977).
230. Id. at 501.
231. 340 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
232. Id.
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The original contract purchaser commenced an action for specific performance. By way of affirmative defense, the developer
argued that a decree of specific performance would not lie in view
33
of the conveyance of the unit to a third party purchaser for value.1
The trial court's final judgment of specific performance was predicated upon a finding that the developer had created deficiencies in
the unit and did not act reasonably to correct them prior to closing.
The developer did not offer any proof to substantiate the contention
that the subsequent conveyance was to a third party bona fide purchaser for value. In affirming the trial court decree, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, found that the burden of going
forward on the issue of whether the unit was conveyed to a third
party purchaser for value and without knowledge of the plaintiff's
outstanding contract rested with the developer and not with the
34
plaintiff, as the developer had contended.1
VI.

LENDER LIABILITY

A lender who funds the construction and development of a condominium project typically exercises his responsibility for protecting the security for his loan by reviewing the plans and the specifications, the project's feasibility and the developer's marketing plan.
A construction lender may reserve the right of inspection during the
course of construction and may employ an architect or engineer to
make inspections. A permanent lender, committed to loan mortgage
money to qualified applicants, may also assume a noticeable presence in the condominium's development and sales program. This
mutual interest in the success of the project has prompted recent
attempts to charge the lender with a duty of care to purchasers of
homes within the project.
Recently, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, refused
to recognize a construction lender's duty to purchasers of condominium units. The court provided a framework within which a construction lender's responsibility to unit owners for the construction
and maintenance of a condominium project can be measured. In
First Wisconsin National Bank v. Roose,2 3 a unit owner, faced with
a defunct developer and wasting condominium project, brought suit
against the construction lender. As security for the loan, the lender
held a mortgage on the entire development, including common
areas and recreational facilities. Plaintiff, individually and on be233. Id.
234. Id. at 1206.
235. 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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half of a class of other unit owners, sued the lender as a joint venturer with the developer and upon a claim that the lender breached
an independent duty of care to the purchasers of units. Plaintiff
contended that this duty included the supervision of the developer's
construction and maintenance activities with regard to the condominium project. 3 ' Furthermore, plaintiff sought to have the trial
court compel the lender to foreclose its lien on the recreational property, reasoning that the lender should not be able to avoid assumption of the maintenance obligation
that would flow from foreclosure
23
on the recreational property.

The Fourth District concluded that insufficient facts were alleged to support imposition of this duty. Furthermore, the court
determined that plaintiff's cause of action to compel foreclosure was
without precedent and subject to dismissal.23 Plaintiff alleged that,
at the time the loan was made, the lender knew of the developer's
promotional representations regarding construction and maintenance of the project, and further, that the property was insufficient
security for the loan."' There were no allegations of an agreement
between the lender and the developer which imposed duties upon
the lender beyond those which were contained in the loan agreement. There were no allegations that the lender had a proprietary
interest in the undertaking or an interest in common with the developer as to the performance of a common purpose. While admittedly
the lender would benefit from the developer's success through a
repayment of principal and interest, there were no allegations that
each would share in the profits of the other. Absent factual allegations in support of the foregoing essential elements of a joint enterprise, the Fourth District refused to hold the lender responsible for
obligations beyond those assumed in the loan agreement. 40
Having determined that the scope of the lender's responsibilities were defined by the loan agreement, the Fourth District also
refused to impose an independent duty of care to unit purchasers.2 '
236. Id. at 611.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. The fact that a lender may have reserved the right of inspection and may have
inspected the property during the course of construction does not imply a duty of care to
supervise construction for the benefit of the purchasers. Rice v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
207 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968). The most notable example of judicial imposition of an
independent duty of care upon a lender was seen in Conner v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969), where the court held that purchasers
of defective single family homes in a large subdivision development could state a cause of
action against the permanent lender arising from the lender's failure to police the developer's
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Implied in the decision is the determination that a lender who restricts its activities or interest in the project to those of an ordinary
lender will not be held liable to unit purchasers.
construction and development. The theories offered by plaintiffs in Connerwere the same as
those alleged in First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Roose, 348 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977). For
substantially the same reasons expressed by the Fourth District, the Supreme Court of California refused to find allegations which, if proved, would establish a joint venture. The
supreme court did, however, impose an independent duty which ran from the lender to the
home purchasers in circumstances where the lender completely failed to deal responsibly with
significant risks created by an incompetent and undercapitalized developer when such circumstances were clearly evident during the course of the relationship between lender and
developer. An instructive analysis of the Conner decision appears in Callaizakis v. Astor Dev.
Co., 4 111. App. 3d 163, 280 N.E.2d 512 (1972), where the court did not impose an independent
duty of care upon a lender whose participation in the development of the project was not
analogous to the degree of participation found in Conner.

